The Forgotten Legal World of Thomas Ruffin: The Power of Presentism in the History of Slave Law by Edwards, Laura F.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 87 | Number 3 Article 7
3-1-2009
The Forgotten Legal World of Thomas Ruffin: The
Power of Presentism in the History of Slave Law
Laura F. Edwards
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Laura F. Edwards, The Forgotten Legal World of Thomas Ruffin: The Power of Presentism in the History of Slave Law, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 855
(2009).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol87/iss3/7
THE FORGOTTEN LEGAL WORLD OF
THOMAS RUFFIN:
THE POWER OF PRESENTISM IN THE
HISTORY OF SLAVE LAW*
LAURA F. EDWARDS**
This Article argues that our current focus on the views of
Thomas Ruffin and other legal elites obscures key elements of
North Carolina's legal past, particularly in regard to slave law.
Legal elites favored the protection of individual rights, the
creation and maintenance of a coherent, identifiable body of state
law, centralization of legal authority at the state level, and a
system that applied those laws uniformly throughout the state.
History proved a particularly powerful weapon in achieving
those ends. By collecting documents, creating archives, and
writing history, legal elites created a powerful narrative that
emphasized the development of a coherent body of state law
based in the protection of rights. While that narrative served
their purposes, it did not describe North Carolina's legal past. In
the period between the Revolution and the Civil War, the state
level was only one element, and not always the most salient one,
in North Carolina's legal system. Local areas retained authority
over most public offenses and adjudicated them through the
interests of the peace, a legal concept that sought to maintain
community order as it was defined in specific areas and one that
did not rely on conceptions of individual rights. Given that
context, Ruffin's decisions represented a new legal direction that
applied individual rights to matters formally governed by the
concept of the peace. Individual rights, moreover, transformed
the nature of slaves' inequality, making it impossible for slaves to
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make claims on the state at all. As this Article argues, the
acceptance of the legal elites' view has contributed to a
misreading of the state's legal past with two important
implications. By accepting the legal elites' paradigm of
individual rights and ignoring the dynamics of localized law, we:
(1) assume that slaves were only passive victims in law, and (2)
limit our own critical vision, by focusing our attention so
narrowly on rights, even though North Carolina's legal past
indicates that rights did not always promote equality. To the
contrary, Thomas Ruffin and other legal reformers in this period
used rights to promote inequality.
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INTRODUCTION
When I conjure up an image of Thomas Ruffin, I see a white-
haired jurist sitting in a throne-like chair, clad in heavy robes,
pondering the future of North Carolina law, and producing decisions
that would affect the legal status of everyone in the state. After years
of researching North Carolina legal culture, I know this image is
inaccurate. To be sure, Ruffin did ponder the future of North
Carolina law, and not just in regard to cases that he heard on the
appellate court. Throughout his career, he worked hard to organize
the state's legal system and systematize state law, a project that other
state leaders supported. These state leaders, many of whom were
professionally trained lawyers, saw law in scientific terms, as an
internally consistent set of universally applicable principles, based
primarily in the protection of rights, particularly the protection of
property rights. To realize this vision, they favored a clearly defined,
authoritative body of state law, overseen by a strong appellate court
staffed by trained professionals. Sitting at the apex of the state's
judicial pyramid, the appellate court would decide legal points in
decisions to be enforced by lower levels of the system, which fell out
in orderly layers beneath, descending from district courts to
individual magistrates in local neighborhoods, with each level
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subordinate to the one above. These reform efforts, however, were
not fully realized in the antebellum period; the institutional context in
which Ruffin worked for most of his life did not allow him a platform
from which to pronounce on state law. In a very literal sense, he did
not sit robed on a throne-like chair. His decisions, moreover, did not
define the legal rules that everyone else in the state had to follow.
Nonetheless, the image of the robed Ruffin-and everything that it
implies about law and the legal system in this period-has a
persistence that I cannot shake because that vision of law has so
profoundly shaped our perception of the past.'
1. The analysis in this piece is informed by different strands of scholarship that
address state formation and historical practice. It takes seriously Benedict Anderson's
notion of the nation as an "imagined" community, in the sense that the concept of a nation
and attachment to it need to be created. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED
COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGINS AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (1983).
That creation, moreover, is facilitated by histories that take the nation as its subject.
Those insights also apply to individual states within the United States, particularly in the
post-Revolutionary period. The process of naturalizing the work of state building in
North Carolina and South Carolina is also similar to that described by political theorist
Etienne Balibar. See Etienne Balibar, The Nation Form: History and Ideology, in RACE,
NATION, CLASS: AMBIGUOUS IDENTITIES 86, 86-106 (Etienne Balibar & Immanuel
Wallerstein eds., 1991). As he argues, nations require a history that obscures the work
that went into creating them by making them appear rooted in nature. Id. at 86. Although
Balibar emphasizes ethnicity and race in this context, the larger point about historical
narratives is that they make nations appear as inevitable formations that arise naturally
from what may, in fact, have had nothing to do with their development. Id. at 96. This
piece also relies on the work of James Vernon and others in nineteenth-century British
political history who explain exactly how those processes of nation building were
obscured. In particular, this scholarship suggests the importance of exploring the broader
cultural work accomplished through the political process: those debates and conflicts did
not just have immediate material effects; they also created powerful narratives that
legitimated particular political formations and shaped how people understood what
politics was. See, e.g., JAMES VERNON, POLITICS AND THE PEOPLE: A STUDY IN
ENGLISH POLITICAL CULTURE, C. 1815-1867, at 295-330 (1993); RE-READING THE
CONSTITUTION: NEW NARRATIVES IN THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND'S LONG
NINETEENTH CENTURY 179-229 (James Vernon ed., 1996) [hereinafter RE-READING
THE CONSTITUTION]. Historical narratives linked to nation building were also deeply
gendered in ways that not only marginalized women but also particular subjects and
methods associated with them. BONNIE G. SMITH, THE GENDER OF HISTORY: MEN,
WOMEN, AND HISTORICAL PRACTICE 146-56 (1998). Those gendered structures are still
evident in the dismissal of local history as "particular" rather than "general" and
"representative," the realm of "amateurs" and "antiquarians" rather than "professionals."
Scholarship in Latin American history that explores alternate visions of "the state" and
"the nation" provides the final element in this analysis. See, e.g., FLORENCIA E. MALLON,
PEASANT AND NATION: THE MAKING OF POSTCOLONIAL MEXICO AND PERU 247-75
(1995); EVERYDAY FORMS OF STATE FORMATION: REVOLUTION AND THE
NEGOTIATION OF RULE IN MODERN MEXICO 3-23 (Gilbert M. Joseph & Daniel Nugent
eds., 1994). Focusing primarily on peasants in the postcolonial period, this work shifts the
perspective away from political differences within and between western nations. In so
doing, this work establishes an important corrective, reminding scholars of the United
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Both the image and its persistence speak volumes about Ruffin
and North Carolina's legal history, but not about what they purport to
represent. They tell us less about law in this period than they do
about 'the success of Ruffin and his cohort of state leaders, mostly
professionally trained lawyers, in capturing history and shaping what
we now think we know about that time. In addition to Thomas
Ruffin, this group of state elite included such men as James Iredell,
Sr., Joseph Gales, John Haywood, William Gaston, Archibald
Murphey, Paul Cameron, David Swain, and James Iredell, Jr.2 What
united them was an intellectual stance, bounded by basic assumptions
about law and the legal system. Reformers as a group tended to
support the creation of a clearly defined, stable body of state law,
centered around the protection of property rights and enforced by a
strong appellate court at the apex of the judicial pyramid. Looking to
government institutions at the state level as the proper locus of
power, they acted as if that were the case even when it was not.
What we remember about this group of state leaders-what I will
call the state elite-is largely a result of sources that these men, their
families, and their friends created and preserved. These men worked
as diligently and enthusiastically to impose order on the state's history
as they did to systematize the state's law. More than that, they saw a
direct connection between law and history. In this regard, North
Carolina leaders participated in projects such as compiling
documentary sources and crafting historical narratives linked to the
liberal project of nation building. The state elite used the past that
they constructed to affirm their vision of law and government, a
vision in which legal authority resided at the state level and state law
was standardized so that rights were uniformly defined and applied.
Their voices acquired resonance over time, as historians relied on
their archive and followed their lead. It is difficult to overstate the
importance of this archive, which forms the source base on which
scholars of the period now rely. These materials, however, provide a
very particular, carefully constructed perspective on the past. The
danger lies in taking that view as the only one. In so doing, we allow
Ruffin and his cohort to take up so much room that we end up
States and western Europe that the liberal state, in the forms that it took in those nations,
was not the only available alternative.
2. This group was much larger for the group of lawyers, planters, and businessmen in
Ruffin's circle. See GAIL WILLIAMS O'BRIEN, THE LEGAL FRATERNITY AND THE
MAKING OF A NEW SOUTH COMMUNITY, 1848-1882, at 79-92 (1986) (describing the
specific roles that members of the legal community played in shaping the history of early
North Carolina).
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duplicating their perspectives, even in our efforts to critique them.
When we begin with the image of the robed Ruffin, we not only miss
aspects of the past that the state elite rejected or sought to obscure,
but also construe key aspects of the past, including slavery, on the
state elite's terms.3
This Article is divided into three Parts. The first Part
reconstructs the institutional context of law in North Carolina
between the Revolution and the Civil War. In this period, the state
level was only one element, and not always the most salient one, in
North Carolina's legal system. Local areas retained authority over
most public offenses and adjudicated them through the interests of
the peace, a legal concept that sought to maintain community order as
it was defined in specific areas. The logic of the peace was directly at
odds with the goals of legal reformers, who favored the protection of
individual rights, the creation and maintenance of a coherent,
identifiable body of state law, the centralization of legal authority at
the state level, and a system that applied those laws uniformly
throughout the state.
The second Part explores the efforts of those legal reformers-
mostly professionally trained lawyers who served in state office-to
achieve those ends. History proved a particularly powerful weapon.
3. This analysis is based on my forthcoming book, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE:
LEGAL CULTURE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF INEQUALITY IN THE POST-
REVOLUTIONARY SOUTH (forthcoming 2009) (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review) [hereinafter EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE]. See generally Laura
F. Edwards, Enslaved Women and the Law: The Paradoxes of Subordination in the Post-
Revolutionary Carolinas, 26 SLAVERY & ABOLITION 305 (2005) [hereinafter Edwards,
Enslaved Women and the Law] (examining the effects of State v. Mann and other cases on
the legal status of female slaves); Laura F. Edwards, Status Without Rights: African
Americans and the Tangled History of Law and Governance in the Nineteenth-Century U.S.
South, 112 AM. HIST. REV. 365, 368 n.6 (2007) [hereinafter Edwards, Status Without
Rights] (examining the system of public law governed by concepts of "the peace," not
rights). This Article is based on legal records and a range of other sources from both the
local and state levels, primarily 1787 to 1840, but also extending into the 1850s. Materials
from the local level are from Orange, Granville, and Chowan Counties. The research
includes extensive runs of court documents from those areas. Unlike sampling, which
abstracts cases from context, this intensive approach reveals information that is essential
to understanding the underlying conflicts and their resolutions. Such an approach also
allows insight into the ways that people defined law, in practice, in the years following the
Revolution. That perspective is particularly important, since so many areas of law were
left to local discretion in this period. The research then extends outward to other counties
to include divorce, apprenticeship, poor house, and church records. At the state level, the
materials cover: statutes, appellate decisions, and various published legal sources; state
government documents such as governors' correspondence, legislative committee reports,
pardons, and petitions; newspapers; and the diaries and letter collections of various
leaders in state law and politics. Although this Article generalizes from these materials,
the analysis is rooted in this archival research.
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By collecting documents, creating archives, and writing history, state
legal reformers created a powerful counter-narrative that emphasized
the development of a coherent body of state law based in the
protection of rights. While that narrative served their purposes, it did
not accurately describe North Carolina's legal past. Not only did
these legal reformers inflate the importance of law at the state level,
the area of the legal system they oversaw and favored, but they also
created the false impression that individual rights have always
governed all legal matters. Nonetheless, their views have provided
the basic foundation for legal histories of the state, because they
resonate with current understandings of how law and the legal system
work. The historical artifacts they left actually reinforce presentism-
the baggage filled with our current assumptions that we carry with us
and that undercut our ability to understand the past.
The final Part considers the implications of the legal reformers'
narratives for our own historical narratives, focusing particularly on
slave law. Placed within a legal context that includes localized law,
Ruffin's decisions take on new meaning. They appear as legal
innovations that applied individual rights to criminal issues involving
slaves, which had been matters governed by the peace. The
application of individual rights fundamentally transformed the nature
of slaves' legal marginality by turning masters' authority into a right
and slaves' subordination into the absence of rights. Once the
possession of individual rights became the standard for legal
protection, slaves had no basis for making claims of any kind in state
law.4 As a result, they appear as passive victims, without any
substantive role in the state's legal history. Their exclusion in these
cases, however, represents only part of a much more complicated
legal history in which slaves did feature in law and the state's legal
history as more than just passive victims without rights. In this sense,
legal reformers' erasure of localized law has immediate ramifications,
contributing to a historical narrative in which slaves and other North
Carolinians appear on the margins. Legal reformers' narrative also
limits our own critical vision by focusing our attention so narrowly on
rights, even though North Carolina's legal past indicates that rights
did not always promote equality. To the contrary, Thomas Ruffin
and other legal reformers in this period used rights to promote
inequality.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 124-33.
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I. THE IMPORTANCE OF LOCALISM IN EARLY NORTH CAROLINA
To reconstruct Thomas Ruffin's legal world, we must first peel
away the layers of historical narrative and interpretation that have
accumulated over two centuries. At the end of the Revolution, it was
impossible for any white-haired, robed man to ponder North Carolina
law, because there was no identifiable body of state law and no single
entity charged with overseeing it. During the Revolution, North
Carolina lawmakers decentralized the most important functions of
government, drawing equally on Revolutionary ideology, established
elements of Anglo-American law, and undercurrents of local political
unrest.5 In the early republic and for much of the antebellum period,
those changes placed a great deal of government business in local
legal venues-not only circuit courts, but also magistrates' hearings,
inquests, and other ad hoc forums.6 As a result, what we now identify
as the state level was largely dependent on these local jurisdictions,
particularly in the period between 1787 and the 1830s. Statutes, for
instance, often responded to individual and local concerns and often
had limited effect beyond the specific issue or area.7 Similarly,
5. The trend embraced a unique blend of Revolutionary ideology, the Anglo-
American legal tradition, and the politics of the 1760s Regulator Movement. See generally
Lars C. Golumbic, Who Shall Dictate the Law?: Political Wrangling Between 'Whig'
Lawyers and Backcountry Farmers in Revolutionary Era North Carolina, 73 N.C. HIST.
REV. 56 (1996) (examining how the natural law perspectives and aspirations of Whig
lawyers conflicted with the informal practices of backcountry judges and legislators in
North Carolina); Walter F. Pratt, Jr., The Struggle for Judicial Independence in Antebellum
North Carolina: The Story of Two Judges, 4 LAW & HIST. REV. 129 (1986) (describing the
importance of judges Thomas Ruffin and William Gaston to the early Supreme Court of
North Carolina); James P. Whittenburg, Planters, Merchants, and Lawyers: Social Change
and the Origins of the North Carolina Regulation, 34 WM. & MARY Q. 215 (1977)
(explaining that the North Carolina Regulation was motivated by differing conceptions of
law as well as by perceived economic and political inferiority).
6. See sources cited supra note 3.
7. The weakness of state government runs through much of the literature. For a
general discussion emphasizing the lack of systematization at this level, see CHARLES M.
COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL
REFORM 3-22 (1981). For new work that emphasizes localism and, by implication,
underscores the relative weakness of state government, see generally THE DEMOCRATIC
EXPERIMENT (Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 2003); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35-72 (2004);
and WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1-17 (1996). South Carolina historians in particular
have focused on the resulting dynamics of this institutional situation for that state,
underscoring broader patterns that apply elsewhere. See LACY K. FORD, JR., ORIGINS OF
SOUTHERN RADICALISM: THE SOUTH CAROLINA UPCOUNTRY, 1800-1860, at 99-214
(1988); RACHEL N. KLEIN, UNIFICATION OF A SLAVE STATE: THE RISE OF THE
PLANTER CLASS IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA BACKCOUNTRY, 1760-1808, at 109-237
(1990).
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appellate decisions resolved issues in particular cases without
necessarily establishing an authoritative guide for other cases
elsewhere in the state.' Legislation and appellate decisions then
accumulated piecemeal, full of inconsistencies and contradictions,
without constituting a systematic body of state law.
In this system, local legal practice was not some quaint, folksy
exception to a formalized, rational body of state law, as is commonly
assumed. Local areas had jurisdiction over a wide range of business.
The local system included the informal discussions and formal
entreaties involved in passing local ordinances, requesting statutes
applicable to specific areas, or obtaining pardons.9 It also included
the grand jury presentments, trials, and other business conducted at
circuit courts, which were held on regular schedules in regional towns
and county seats.1" But those elements of the local system were only
the most visible part of a system dominated by formal legal
proceedings that took place in informal arenas. Magistrates'
hearings, inquests, and other ad hoc legal forums occurred in places
such as taverns, houses, and yards." It was in all these informal, local
legal arenas that southerners did the business of "keeping the peace,"
a well-established concept in Anglo-American law that referred to
the institutional processes involved in maintaining social order. That
order was expressed through the term "the peace," which represented
the metaphorical public body, subordinating everyone (in varying
ways) within a hierarchical system and emphasizing social order over
individual rights.'" Local decisions applied to specific issues in
8. For a discussion of the development of the jurisdiction of the court that came to
be the appellate court in North Carolina, see William J. Adams, Evolution of Law in
North Carolina, 2 N.C. L. REV. 133, 138-45 (1924); Golumbic, supra note 5, at 61-75;
Atwell Campbell McIntosh, The Jurisdiction of the North Carolina Supreme Court, 5 N.C.
L. REV. 5, 5-27 (1926); Pratt, Jr., supra note 5, at 133-42; Walter Parker Stacy, Brief
Review of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, 4 N.C. L. REV. 115, 115-17 (1926); and
George Stevenson, Higher Court Records, in NORTH CAROLINA RESEARCH:
GENEALOGY AND LOCAL HISTORY 329, 329-44 (Helen F. M. Leary ed., 2d ed. 1996).
For similar trends in other southern states, see KRAMER, supra note 7, at 158-64; F.
THORNTON MILLER, JURIES AND JUDGES VERSUS THE LAW: VIRGINIA'S PROVINCIAL
LEGAL PERSPECTIVE, 1783-1829, at 63-73 (1994); Donald Senese, Building the Pyramid:
The Growth and Development of the State Courts System in Antebellum South Carolina,
1800-1860, 24 S.C. L. REV. 357, 357-62 (1972); and Christopher M. Curtis, Jefferson's
Chosen People: Legal and Political Conceptions of the Freehold in the Old Dominion
from Revolution to Reform 56-93 (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory
University) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
9. See sources cited supra note 3.
10. See sources cited supra note 3.
11. See sources cited supra note 3.
12. See EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE, supra note 3 (manuscript at 65).
The dynamics of the local process are similar to those described in CYNTHIA HERRUP,
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specific areas. The decision in a case of assault resolved that conflict
instead of establishing or following precedent that applied to other
assault cases. These decisions officially shared space with legislation
and appellate decisions as central components of state law, because
North Carolina government was relatively weak and delegated so
much authority to local jurisdictions. North Carolina was not unique
in this regard. Although historians have often associated "localism"
with the South, this approach to law and government was not
peculiarly "southern" at the time.13 As recent scholarship has
emphasized, similar arrangements characterized both the theory and
practice of law and government throughout the United States in the
post-Revolutionary period.14
Not all areas of law were equally localized. The state elite
experienced more success in systematizing and centralizing control
over property law because of the history of this area of law. Property
law, as developed in equity and common law, had been claimed by
lawyers even before the Revolution.15 In colonial economies that
looked outward to the Atlantic world, knowledge of property law was
crucial to economic success. By the time of the Revolution, links to
international markets resulted in the development of relatively
sophisticated financial structures to assist in property exchange,
capital formation, and the management of credit and debt." That was
THE COMMON PEACE: PARTICIPATION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW IN
SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND 193-206 (1987) (discussing the societal operation of
the criminal law in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries). See also
ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA,
1800-1880, at 87-89 (1989) (discussing how nineteenth-century courts handled breach of
the peace cases in Philadelphia).
13. New trends in legal and political history have emphasized the importance of
localism throughout the United States, suggesting that the South was not distinctive in this
regard. See sources cited supra note 5. That scholarship dovetails with new work in
southern history that emphasizes that southern states were not undeveloped compared to
northern states-and therefore not uniquely local. See PETER BARDAGLIO,
RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX, AND THE LAW IN THE
NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 5-23 (1995); CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, ROOTS OF
DISORDER: RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1817-1880, at 15-
18(1998).
14. See sources cited supra note 13.
15. For the pervasiveness of lawyers in the realm of property law-or civil law-in
North Carolina, see generally Whittenburg, supra note 5. For the general point about the
influence of lawyers in this area of law, see generally BRUCE MANN, NEIGHBORS AND
STRANGERS: LAW AND COMMUNITY IN EARLY CONNECTICUT (1987).
16. For a discussion of economic development in low country South Carolina, see
generally PETER A. COCLANIS, THE SHADOW OF A DREAM: ECONOMIC LIFE AND
DEATH IN THE SOUTH CAROLINA LOW COUNTRY, 1670-1920 (1989).
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true even in the North Carolina backcountry, which lagged behind
coastal areas economically.
17
The influence of professionalized law was pervasive enough that
even ordinary economic transactions, such as the purchase of land,
required the interposition of lawyers. Lawyers solidified their hold
on property and commerce in the decades following the Revolution,
given the unsettled state of the economy, the scarcity of cash and
credit, and the uncertainty of land titles in North Carolina. The trend
continued into the nineteenth century, largely because of the
widespread use of notes, mortgages, and other instruments of debt as
the primary means of economic exchange and capital formation.
Over time, property law became even more professionalized, with
standardized rules used by lawyers throughout the state.'8 As such, it
was more easily organized into a coherent body of law and
centralized at the state level, because the legal practice had already
moved in that direction. Indeed, the preponderance of property cases
in circuit courts and the appellate level registered the relative
inaccessibility of this area of law.
Local areas maintained authority over everything else-the
broad, ambiguous area of public law, which included all crimes as well
17. Eastern North Carolina had a successful economy based in exports and
international trade by the time of the Revolution, and growth continued for the next few
decades. See Alice Barnwell Keith, John Gray and Thomas Blount, Merchants, 1783-1800,
25 N.C. HIST. REV. 194, 194-204 (1948); Whittenburg, supra note 5, at 224-28.
18. Civil suits constituted the great bulk of court business in most southern
jurisdictions, including North Carolina. Edward Ayers estimates that there were about
three or four civil cases for every criminal case in a typical southern court. EDWARD L.
AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-CENTURY
AMERICAN SOUTH 32 (1984); see also ARIELA J. GROSS, DOUBLE CHARACTER:
SLAVERY AND MASTERY IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTHERN COURTROOM 23 (2000)
(discussing the large number of civil cases in southern courts involving the commercial law
of slavery). Those patterns also characterized the courts in Granville County, Orange
County, and Chowan County, as is evident from comparison of the record groups, Civil
Action Papers, and Criminal Action Papers for the superior courts, on file in the North
Carolina Office of Archives and History in Raleigh. See sources cited supra note 3. For
Chowan County, for instance, there are 116 boxes of Civil Action Papers (including the
related groups of Civil Actions Concerning Land and Civil Actions Concerning Timber)
from 1730 to 1922 and thirty-eight boxes of Criminal Action Papers from 1720 to 1933.
These records do not constitute a complete record of the superior courts' business, but
they do give an accurate sense of general patterns. The importance of property law is also
apparent in lawyers' practices, which are composed primarily of such matters. See William
Gaston Papers (on file with the Southern Historical Collection ("SHC"), Wilson Library,
The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) [hereinafter William Gaston Papers]
(business related correspondence); Cameron Family Papers (on file with the SHC, Wilson
Library, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) (business related
correspondence).
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as a range of ill-defined offenses that disrupted the peace. 9 This area
of law was governed primarily by common law in its flexible,
customary form, not its more formal variant. Magistrate's manuals,
based in centuries-old English guides, were the primary legal
reference, particularly for cases settled before they reached jury trials
at circuit courts.20  Neither statutes nor case law provided much
direction, even for those inclined to look to these bodies for guidance,
until the 1820s and 1830s. This area of law also remained less
professionalized much longer than property law. 21  Lawyers and
judges who might have had formal training did not become involved
in most public offenses, even serious felonies, until the final stages,
when a case went to a jury trial at the circuit courts. Only a small
fraction of these matters ever went to trial in circuit courts where
lawyers worked.22
19. See infra notes 67-68.
20. See generally JOHN HAYWOOD, THE DUTY AND OFFICE OF JUSTICES OF THE
PEACE, SHERIFFS, CORONERS, CONSTABLES, &C. ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF THE
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA (Raleigh, N.C., Boylan 1808) (providing the standard guide
in North Carolina). Most states had such guides, usually published by private individuals
and based in either MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE (London, Societie of
Stationers 1622), or RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER
(London, Strahan 1836). For discussion of the infrequency of minor criminal matters in
circuit courts, where professionalized rules tended to dominate, see sources cited supra
note 7 and infra note 21 and accompanying text.
21. Concerted efforts at the state level to clarify and regularize these areas of law
were notably lacking until the 1820s and 1830s, largely because they were far less lucrative
for lawyers and less important to state leaders, who were often lawyers as well. The books
that lawyers used were short on detail in these areas. For books used in legal education,
see Letter from Robert Williams to William Lenoir (July 30, 1799), in Lenoir Family
Papers (on file with the SHC, Wilson Library, The University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill); Letter from William Rodman to William Gaston (July 6, 1830), in William Gaston
Papers, supra note 18; Letter from John Bynum to William Gaston (July 9, 1834), in
William Gaston Papers, supra note 18; and Letter from Tod R. Caldwell to Thomas Ruffin
(Jan. 9, 1840), in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN 180-81 (J.G. de Roulhauc Hamilton
ed., 1918). Blackstone, the fundamental text in post-Revolutionary legal education, had
sections on crimes, but they lacked the specifics necessary to prosecute or adjudicate cases.
Fines and punishments, when not established by statute, were left to the discretion of local
courts and varied widely. The guidelines in Blackstone are representative of the lack of
details in governing legal authorities read by aspiring lawyers. See generally 3 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1898) (on private wrongs);
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1898) (on
public wrongs).
22. The generalizations about the local process are drawn from research in records on
file with the North Carolina Office of Archives and History, Raleigh (Criminal Action
Papers, Granville County (1790-1840); Criminal Actions Concerning Slaves and Free
Persons of Color, Granville County (1800-1839); Superior Court Minutes, Granville
County (1790-1840); Criminal Action Papers, Orange County (1787-1808); Superior
Court Minutes, Orange County (1787-1840)). For further explication of the process, see
generally Edwards, Status Without Rights, supra note 3; and Laura Edwards, Law,
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In principle and practice, the localized legal system based the
definition and administration of law in the protection of the
"peace."" Localized law did not recognize distinctions between
"law," "politics," "administration," or "custom" that later became
important within governmental institutions, particularly at the state
level. This system emphasized process over principle: each
jurisdiction followed similar procedures in prosecuting cases but
produced inconsistent rulings because they used legal authorities and
precedents eclectically to restore order, as they defined it, in their
own communities, aimed at restoring the peace. The peace
represented a hierarchical order, which forced everyone into its
patriarchal embrace and raised its collective interests over those of
any given individual. The content of those collective interests
remained purposefully vague because the peace was both governed
and constituted by relationships and practices that varied from
locality to locality. North Carolinians regularly called on the
authority of the peace to resolve what they regarded as serious
problems, drawing law into the entire range of personal conflicts and
community disorders: wandering livestock and quarrelsome
neighbors shared legal quarters with gamblers, drinkers, wife beaters,
and even planters who committed offenses against their slaves.24
All North Carolinians participated in the identification of
offenses, the resolution of conflicts, and the definition of law. Even
domestic dependents-wives, children, servants, and slaves, legally
subordinated to their household heads-as well as others whose race,
class, and gender marked them as subordinates-free blacks,
unmarried free women, and poor whites-had direct access to
localized law.25 These groups also had some influence over the law,
albeit through the relationships that subordinated them within
families and communities, without any recognition of their individual
rights. In theory, their subordination entailed connections to
localized law: dependents accessed law through their specified places
within the peace. Similarly, white patriarchs exercised domestic
authority at the behest of the peace, not in their own right. When
their actions disturbed the peace, through either their inadequate or
their excessive use of authority, they experienced censure. Keeping
Domestic Violence, and the Limits of Patriarchal Authority in the Antebellum South, 65 J.
S. HIST. 733, 737 n.7 (1999) [hereinafter Edwards, Domestic Violence].
23. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
24. See EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE, supra note 3 (manuscript at 90-
98, 102-11).
25. See id. (manuscript at 100-32).
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the peace meant keeping everyone-from the lowest to the highest-
in their appropriate places.2 6
These local courts charged with keeping the peace focused on the
resolution of highly personal, idiosyncratic disputes. Legal judgments
rested on the situated knowledge of observers in local communities in
which an individual's "credit," or reputation, was established through
family and neighborly ties and was continually assessed through
gossip networks. Local officials and juries judged the reliability of
testimony based on an individual's credit as well as on impersonal,
prescriptive markers of status, such as gender, race, age, or class. In
this system, dependents' words could assume considerable legal
authority. A slave's well-placed remarks about his master's financial
difficulties or a wife's pointed complaints to neighbors when begging
for essential supplies acquired resonance as they moved through local
gossip networks. 27  Such information shaped the terms of legal
matters before they even entered courtrooms. Dependents thus
exercised influence in law without being able to change, or even
challenge, their legal subordination. By the same logic, one person's
experience was not transferable to another person of similar status
(defined by such characteristics as gender, race, or class) or predictive
of any other case's outcome. The result was a legal system composed
of inconsistent local rulings that offered future courts various options
rather than precedents; in public matters, there was no uniform "law"
to which to appeal. These disparate outcomes coexisted as options
and alternatives rather than contradictions requiring rationalization.
Localized law proved remarkably impervious to change. Not all
members of the North Carolina state legislature were part of the
group of professionally trained lawyers who favored legal reform. In
the decades immediately following the Revolution, the North
Carolina legislature enhanced local authority by extending
magistrates' jurisdiction, especially over property issues involving
debt. These measures, known as the "ten pound law" of 1785 and the
"twenty pound law" of 1787, gave magistrates jurisdiction in all civil
26. The summary in this paragraph is drawn from records on file with the North
Carolina Office of Archives and History, Raleigh (Criminal Action Papers, Granville
County (1790-1840); Criminal Actions Concerning Slaves and Free Persons of Color,
Granville County (1800-1839); Superior Court Minutes, Granville County (1790-1840);
Criminal Action Papers, Orange County (1787-1808); Superior Court Minutes, Orange
County (1787-1840)). For discussions of the range of offenses and the participation of
domestic dependents and others without rights, see generally Edwards, Status Without
Rights, supra note 3; and Edwards, Domestic Violence, supra note 22.
27. See sources cited supra note 18. For gossip and situated knowledge, see Edwards,
Enslaved Women and the Law, supra note 3, at 305-23.
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matters with damages up to twenty pounds.2 They also gave
magistrates jurisdiction in a wide range of criminal matters, except
over the most serious offenses.29 As a result, magistrates acquired
significant legal discretion in debt cases as well as most public
offenses and criminal issues. The process, in historian Lars C.
Golumbic's apt description, allowed magistrates to "leave Blackstone
and the perplexing body of common law behind and adjudicate
simply, personally, and pragmatically."3 The legislature underscored
its intent through additional legislation that regulated attorney's fees,
practice, and licensing.31 All these laws were widely reviled by
professionally trained lawyers. "[M]y Passions," fumed one
prominent lawyer, "[are] so agitated with the unbecoming means
which had been used to cast a stigma upon the bar.
'3 2
The state's lawyers, however, were unable to budge the
legislature on the issue of magistrates' jurisdiction. Not only did the
legislature slowly increase magistrates' jurisdiction after the "twenty
pound law" of 1787, but it also added district courts to the system. In
1806, the legislature replaced the eight district courts with superior
courts in each county. A key group of lawyers in the state elite
opposed the change because it required those who wished to practice
law as their sole profession to travel to each county for court instead
of having business come to them at the district courthouse.33 Adding
injury to insult, the act also reduced the fees of the attorneys who
practiced in the superior courts. "The prospect is dull to men of
eminence," sulked Thomas Ruffin's friend Archibald Murphey.34
"Under this System Genius will languish, enterprise grow feeble and
Petit-fogging become fashionable."35 "[H]ad not I expended so much
money in making an establishment," he concluded bleakly, "I would
break up and go to Nashville."36 According to William Henry Hoyt, a
historian writing in the early twentieth century, the act led to a legal
28. Golumbic, supra note 5, at 74, 77.
29. Id. at 73-77.
30. Id. at 74.
31. Id. at 73-77.
32. Id. at 78 (originals in 2 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 132-33
(Griffith J. McRee ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1858)).
33. 1 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY 7 n.2 (William Henry Hoyt ed.,
1914). Hoyt notes that opponents included Duncan Cameron, James Norwood, and
William Duffy, all prominent lawyers in the legislature. Id.
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exodus from the state.37 Among the defectors was John Haywood,
noted for his magistrate's manual and collection of statutes as well as
his work on the bench and his training of a host of prominent
lawyers.38
Despite the emphasis on debt in legislative debates, the
extension of magistrates' jurisdiction shaped the adjudication of
public matters far more than it did property issues. In the area of
property, the controversial "twenty pound law" allowed magistrates
to structure creative debt settlements for farmers who lacked the
currency demanded by creditors, but who were not without other
economic resources.: Lawyers' complaints notwithstanding, it did
not eliminate their role or the importance of professionalized
property law in mediating most economic transactions. By contrast,
the laws extending magistrates' jurisdiction solidified local control
over the vast majority of public offenses, most of which never made it
to the superior courts, where lawyers plied their trade.
Given this culture of localism, efforts to create a more powerful
appellate court at the apex of the judicial structure had ambiguous
results, particularly in the area of public law. The legislature did add
an appeals court in 1799 that heard cases in both law and equity.4 ° At
first, however, this court was extremely limited in its authority. It was
actually an extension of the district courts, composed of district
judges who met after their circuits to discuss appeals. Nor did it have
final authority over its cases and points of law or equity, at least
initially.41 It was exactly what its name, the Court of Conference,
implied: it functioned as an advisory body, which met after the
district courts to allow judges to confer over appeals and particularly
difficult cases.42 Its recommendations were returned with the cases to
the district courts where the final decisions were rendered.43
Legislators rejected other proposals to create a more powerful high
court on the grounds that it would be too distant geographically from
37. Id. at 7 n.2.
38. Id.
39. Golumbic, supra note 5, at 78-79.
40. See WALTER CLARK, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
6-7 (1919) ("There was no appellate court until this one was created in 1799."); Adams,
supra note 8, at 137-38.
41. See Adams, supra note 8, at 137-38; Stevenson, supra note 8, at 343.
42. See Stevenson, supra note 8, at 343.
43. See id.
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most people, too expensive for them to make use of, and too
concerned with the abstractions of law to render justice.44
At issue were two distinct views of the legal system. Defending
the unsuccessful 1799 reform measure to replace the Court of
Conference with a stronger Court of Errors and Appeals, state legal
luminary Samuel Johnston argued that such a court was necessary to
"the due execution of the laws" by which the people "hold their
liberty and property."45 "Under our present system," he explained,
"what is law at one place is not law at another. The opinions of
Judges vary; and the decision of one Judge is disregarded by
another."46 The situation made little sense to him, which was why he
supported a central court, "which shall govern all the varying
decisions which may be given in various parts of the State."'47 Only
then would "some security ... be had for the due administration of
Justice."4 The majority, however, saw no problem at all with the
current system, despite its inconsistencies. As one representative
argued, the "great end of law is to obtain justice for individuals, and
therefore the administration of justice ought to be made as
convenient to the citizens at large as possible."4 9 For him and others,
the legal system was about resolving specific conflicts and achieving
justice for those involved, not elaborating a uniform body of law that
would hold everywhere, without attention to context. The facts of the
case, not abstract points of law, were the central components of
justice. Given that, he could not see "that this Judge of Appeal would
be more likely to do justice than a Jury."5 So, in his view, why have a
court of appeals at all?
The North Carolina legislature did eventually expand the
authority of the Court of Conference, but the process was so
convoluted that it is difficult to identify the decisive moment of
change. In 1804, the North Carolina legislature made the Court of
Conference a court of record. This change meant that the court
functioned more like an appellate court in the sense that it could now
44. See, e.g., RALEIGH REG., Dec. 10, 1799, at 1. (relaying the legislature's debate
regarding the creation of a higher court, and stating that the creation of this court will
"remove it as far from [the people] as the state will admit of; and takes away the relief now
afforded without substituting a better").
45. Id. The debate was closely followed elsewhere in the state. See, e.g., N.C.
MERCURY & SALISBURY ADVERTISER, Dec. 26, 1799, at 2.
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render decisions instead of just dispensing advice to district courts. It
remains unclear, however, how that worked in practice. 1 In 1806, the
legislature renamed this body the "Supreme Court," a change that
some have identified as a turning point in the court's history, though
one with very limited results. 2 Writing in 1912, historian William
Henry Hoyt described it in this way: the court was "held twice a year
at Raleigh by two or more of the Superior Court judges, to which
were submitted, not appeals, but difficult or doubtful cases arising on
the circuits."53 Those judges did not always reach consensus in each
case. Even when they did, they still issued separate opinions and
made no attempt to reconcile conflicting judgments on points of law.54
This court was supreme in name only. Some commentators identify
1810 as the key date in the court's history, for that was when the
legislature approved the appointment of a chief justice to coordinate
the different opinions of the judges. 5 But the legislature neglected to
specify how the chief justice would be selected; as late as 1834, it was
still being done by drawing lots (that year, Thomas Ruffin won).56
Only in 1818 did the court become "supreme" in more than name,
acquiring its own panel of judges and authority over points of law and
equity.57 It was an unexpected victory for reformers, who seemed a
little taken aback. "This will surprise you as it has every one here,"
wrote a delighted Archibald Murphey to Thomas Ruffin after the
General Assembly's vote.58
51. See sources cited supra note 8.
52. See CLARK, supra note 40, at 7.
53. 1 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, supra note 33, at 7 n.2.
54. See generally Thomeguex v. Bell, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 64 (1794) (documenting two
separate opinions and stating that the second opinion was "clearly of the contrary
opinion," without further explanation); Tims v. Potter, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 12 (1784)
(articulating three distinct opinions from three judges, one of whom was absent and
disagreed with the opinion).
55. See CLARK, supra note 40, at 7.
56. For more information on selecting the chief justice by drawing lots, see Letter
from William Gaston to Robert Donaldson (Jan. 3, 1834), in William Gaston Papers,
supra note 18.
57. See Stevenson, supra note 8, at 342-43.
58. Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin (Dec. 3, 1818), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 21, at 211. The change provoked a flurry of
correspondence. See Letter from Romulus M. Saunders to Thomas Ruffin (Dec. 17,
1818), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 21, at 212; Letter from James
Mebane to Thomas Ruffin (Dec. 18, 1818), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra
note 21, at 212-13; Letter from George E. Badger to Thomas Ruffin (Dec. 18, 1818), in 1
THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 21, at 213; Letter from Duncan Cameron to
Thomas Ruffin (Dec. 25, 1822), in 1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 21, at
273. For these changes, see generally sources cited supra note 8.
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The commitment to localized law continued to undercut
centralization into the 1830s. The legislature remained divided in its
support for the appellate court-now called the Supreme Court. So
the Supreme Court of North Carolina limped along after its creation
in 1818, trying to acquire institutional legitimacy in an openly hostile
environment. 59  Its critics launched measures to eviscerate it or to
abolish it altogether in nearly every legislative session during the
1820s and into the 1830s.6" Even some of the court's judges were less
than enthusiastic and could not be bothered to attend regularly. The
resulting backlog of cases further tarnished the court's reputation.61
By the 1830s the court was so unpopular that even its staunchest
backers began to doubt its efficacy. When William Gaston took the
bench in 1833, the court's supporters hoped that his reputation might
help repair the damage. 62 "[W]e think," wrote Governor David L.
59. Pratt, supra note 5, at 135 ("In the absence of substantial constitutional restraints
on the legislature, the supreme court quickly became a target of attacks by democratic
reformers.").
60. Id. ("No blend of democratic argument with remedies for relieving congestion
could allay the fears of many politicians of the Whig or old Federalist school that each
reform suggestion was motivated by a desire to abolish the supreme court altogether.").
61. The Supreme Court of North Carolina only barely survived repeated efforts to
dismantle it. See RALEIGH REG., Dec. 17, 1819, at 2 (citing a bill that was proposed to
reduce the salaries of state supreme court judges, a recurring effort meant to discourage
the centralization and professionalization of the judiciary); RALEIGH REG., Dec. 8, 1820,
at 2 (citing a proposed bill to reduce the salaries of state supreme court judges and to
abolish the state supreme court); RALEIGH REG., Nov. 30, 1821, at 3 (citing proposed bill
to limit the meetings of the supreme court to once a year, thereby limiting the authority of
the court); RALEIGH REG., Dec. 26, 1823, at 2 (citing proposed bill to reduce the salaries
of the state supreme court judges); RALEIGH REG., Nov. 26, 1824, at 2 (citing bill to
completely abolish the supreme court); RALEIGH REG., Dec. 17, 1824, at 2 (mentioning
bill to remove precedent-setting authority of supreme court); RALEIGH REG., Dec. 24,
1824, at 2 (citing bills to abolish the state supreme court); RALEIGH REG., Jan. 2, 1829, at
1 (detailing bill to establish an extra term to meet in Salisbury and other places throughout
the state, which were efforts to recreate the old district system); RALEIGH REG., Jan. 23,
1829, at 1 (detailing bill to reduce the judges' salaries); RALEIGH REG., Nov. 26, 1829, at 2
(noting bill to abolish the supreme court and reestablish the conference court); RALEIGH
REG., Nov. 25, 1830, at 2 (citing bill to have the court meet in other parts of the state);
RALEIGH REG., Jan. 27, 1831, at 1 (detailing bill to reduce the judges' salaries); RALEIGH
REG., Jan. 25, 1833, at 1 (detailing bills to reduce judges' salaries); RALEIGH REG., Nov.
26, 1833, at 3 (detailing bill to abolish the court); RALEIGH REG., Dec. 3, 1833 (detailing
bill to replace the court with the old district system and a conference court); RALEIGH
REG., Dec. 17, 1833, at 2 (citing bill to reduce judges' salaries). For a discussion of
hostility toward the court, see generally Wythe Holt & James R. Perry, Writs and Rights,
"Clashings and Animosities": The First Confrontation Between Federal and State
Jurisdictions, 7 L. & HIST. REV. 89 (1989); and Pratt, supra note 5, at 137 (discussing the
legislature's attempt to relieve the court of the "congestion" of equity cases by passing
legislation that would limit equity cases).
62. Supporters of a strong appellate court saw the appointment of Gaston as key, and
the resulting correspondence reveals a great deal about the problems they sought to
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Swain, "your appointment to the Bench the only event which will
preserve the Court and certainly the only event which can render it
worth preserving."63 The court's unpopularity, however, gave Gaston
pause. "[T]he possibility that sooner or later these efforts of
Demagogues may be successful," he wrote, made him "exceedingly
loth [sic] to place himself in so precarious a situation."'  Yet he
agreed and a few months later found himself drawing lots with
Thomas Ruffin to see who would become chief justice.65 Their
compatriot, Judge Joseph Daniel, did not participate; although he did
not indicate why, he had no desire to take on the judicial mantle of
chief justice.66
Institutional power, even when attained, did not always translate
into systemic change in legal practice or the logic of the law. To the
extent that the state legislators and appellate court judges exercised
their power, it was over property law. Until the 1820s, legislators and
judges tended to leave governance over public matters to local
jurisdictions and their idiosyncratic interpretations of common law.67
resolve. See Letter from William Gaston to Hannah Manly (Dec. 31, 1832), in William
Gaston Papers, supra note 18; Letter from T.P. Devereux to William Gaston (Aug. 15,
1833), in William Gaston Papers, supra note 18; Letter from William Gaston to T.P.
Devereux (Aug. 19, 1833), in William Gaston Papers, supra note 18; Letter from Thomas
Ruffin to William Gaston (Aug. 21, 1833), in William Gaston Papers, supra note 18; Letter
from T.P. Devereux to William Gaston (Aug. 21, 1833), in William Gaston Papers, supra
note 18; Letter from William Gaston to T.P. Devereux (Aug. 26, 1833), in William Gaston
Papers, supra note 18; Letter from David Swain to William Gaston (Aug. 27, 1833), in
William Gaston Papers, supra note 18; Letter from T.P. Devereux to William Gaston
(Aug. 30, 1833), in William Gaston Papers, supra note 18; RALEIGH REG., Nov. 26, 1833,
in William Gaston Papers, supra note 18; RALEIGH REG., Dec. 10, 1833, in William
Gaston Papers, supra note 18; Letter from Joseph Hopkinson to William Gaston (Dec. 28,
1834), in William Gaston Papers, supra note 18 (referring to events in South Carolina);
Letter from B.F. Perry to William Gaston (July 10, 1836), in William Gaston Papers, supra
note 18 (referring also to events in South Carolina); see also 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS
RUFFIN, supra note 21, at 92 n.1 ("I cannot restrain myself from saying that I cordially
unite in the congratulations your friends will tender to you in the triumph which the lovers
of virtue and the admirers of ability ... will feel in the consolatory confidence in the
stability of our institutions and the faithful administration of justice.").
63. Letter from David Swain to William Gaston (Sept. 3, 1833), in William Gaston
Papers, supra note 18.
64. Letter from William Gaston to Thomas Ruffin (Aug. 25, 1833), in William Gaston
Papers, supra note 18.
65. Letter from William Gaston to Robert Donaldson (Jan. 3, 1834), in William
Gaston Papers, supra note 18.
66. Id.
67. A brief glance at the North Carolina Reports indicates that the preponderance of
appellate decisions dealt with property issues. The majority of statutes, which included
private bills, dealt with property issues as well. Many of these cases involved slaves, in
their status as property. See, e.g., Gorham v. Wife, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 3 (1780) (discussing
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Statutes and appellate decisions mirrored changes at the local level
when they dealt with crimes and other public offenses at all.68
Attempting to navigate the legal terrain of the peace with the
map of individual rights has led historians into dead ends and
puzzling contradictions. Taking the ascendancy of the individualist
legal paradigm for granted and focusing on statutes and appellate
decisions, they have struggled to identify consistent patterns in the
application of rights to marginalized members of the population.69
whether a mother was entitled to any of her late child's inheritance, which included the
father's slaves).
68. EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE, supra note 3 (manuscript at 229-38).
The scholarship on state law is particularly revealing. Historians who have searched
assiduously for systematic legal patterns in these early appellate records and statutes have
found them frustratingly incoherent. See generally, THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN
SLAVERY AND THE LAW, 1619-1860 (1996) (discussing the development of slave law).
Some have thrown up their hands, accepting contemporary legal reformers' charges of
incompetence and chaos. That conclusion is expressed in the title of Walter Johnson's
review essay, although he does not see the contradictions as necessarily problematic.
Walter Johnson, Inconsistency, Contradiction, and Complete Confusion: The Everyday
Life of the Law of Slavery, 22 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 405, 415, 417 (1997) ("State involvement
in the daily relations of the master and slave, however, was infrequent and subject to local
standards .... Local outrage was usually behind the rare state interventions in the
business of brutal slaveholders."). The most generous interpretations characterize these
early appellate decisions as rendering broad interpretations of the statutes. Actually, the
records say more about the influence of localized law in the area of public law than they
do about the statutes or the direction of legal developments at the state level. These
opinions resulted from a system that not only allowed local jurisdictions considerable legal
discretion in public matters but also subordinated the individual outcomes to the collective
interests of the peace. Id.
69. The literature, for instance, continues to use rights as the standard to determine
changes in slaves' status over time. See generally ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT
RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LAW OF SLAVERY IN
THE U.S. SOUTH (1992) (explaining that courts began recognizing certain defenses for
slaves but also highlighting the limitations to this right); EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL,
JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE 25-49 (1974) (describing a slow
convergence of rights given to slaves in the American South); MICHAEL STEPHEN
HINDUS, PRISON AND PLANTATION: CRIME, JUSTICE, AND AUTHORITY IN
MASSACHUSETTS AND SOUTH CAROLINA, 1767-1878, at 125-61 (1980) (arguing that
trends in death sentences given to slaves demonstrate an increase in the rights of slaves);
MORRIS, supra note 68 (comparing the legal statuses of slaves in different areas of the
United States and throughout history using rights as the standard in all areas of law);
JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH
(1998) (arguing that rights were at odds with slavery and inevitably undermined it); PHILIP
J. SCHWARZ, TWICE CONDEMNED: SLAVES AND THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF VIRGINIA,
1705-1865, at 66-91 (documenting the criminal trials and sentences of slaves) (1988);
CHRISTOPHER WALDREP, ROOTS OF DISORDER: RACE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH, 1817-80 (1998) (distinguishing the ways in which slaves were
punished, often informally, from the ways whites were treated, specifically in Vicksburg,
Mississippi, with the assumption of rights the norm); Daniel J. Flanigan, Criminal
Procedure in Slave Trials in the Antebellum South, 40 J. S. HIST. 537 (1974) (discussing the
inconsistent manner in which slaves were treated and how the treatment was based on
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But those institutions and that legal framework had yet to be fully
elaborated, particularly in the area of criminal law. In the 1820s, the
state elite began to extend that rubric, building on incremental
changes in law generated at the state level within a reformed
institutional structure that elevated state law over other bodies of law.
But the extension of individual rights into the legal process-the
trends that scholars have observed-was not the same thing as the
extension of individual rights to those individuals who made up the
population as a whole.
II. HOW THE STATE ELITE ATrEMPTED TO UNIFY STATE LAW
The story of legal localism was not one that the state elite told,
largely because they wanted to discredit it and replace it. To those
ends, they used rhetorical tropes common in the Revolution and
described localism as an archaic holdover, which was-or would be-
banished from the state as Revolutionary enlightenment replaced
monarchical corruption.7" While inaccurate, their accounts created a
powerful story of progress that became the basis for later academic
histories and that continues to shape current scholarship. In fact, the
state elite were far more successful in imposing their vision after the
fact, crowding out the views of those who saw the legal system
both the nature of the crime and the jurisdiction in which it took place); Arnold Edmund
Keir Nash, Negro Rights and Judicial Behavior in the Old South (Sept. 1967)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review) (examining favorable treatment of slaves by several judges in the antebellum
South).
70. Such statements and assumptions pervade the writing of the professional lawyers
who also served at the state level. They routinely referred to the "chaos" of the legal past.
Typical is William Gaston's support of the 1818 bill that would establish North Carolina's
appellate court as an independent body with precedent-setting authority. "[T]here must
be in every free community some Supreme Court of Judicature to decide conclusively on
every question of Law, to compel all inferior tribunals to adhere to the same exposition of
the public will, and to [make] ... Civil Conduct permanent, uniform and universal."
RALEIGH REG., Dec. 4, 1818. Without such a court, as had been the case in the past, "no
individual can be certain that what is law to-day will be deemed law to-morrow [sic]; or
that what is right in his neighbor may not be adjudged wrong in himself." Id. Under such
condition, Gaston continued, "property ... [would] ... become insecure, and liberty itself
endangered by fluctuating and inconsistent adjudications." Id. He ended with the
metaphor of slavery, which had been central to the rhetoric of the Revolution and still
carried considerable resonance, particularly in the slave South: "Miserable is that
servitude where rights are ambiguous, and the law unknown." Id. While speaking in the
conditional-of what would happen-Gaston was actually referring to the situation in
North Carolina and its immediate past. Id. (citing a report by the legislature
subcommittee, chaired by William Gaston, on creating a separate appellate court with
authority over law). For a general discussion of the issue and more examples, see
EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE, supra note 3 (manuscript at 26-53).
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differently. Their efforts to achieve substantive change in the legal
system took decades to achieve tangible results. In practice, they
were not fully realized until after the Civil War, as part of the
systematic reform of the region under the terms of the Congressional
Reconstruction plan and the dramatic revision of state constitutions
under Republican rule.7' The institution of capitalist labor relations
and the extension of individual rights to former slaves required a
hierarchical legal system that construed law as a set of universal rules,
consistently applied. Most reformers who lived through the Civil War
era bitterly opposed the abolition of slavery, the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, and other changes that came with
Republican rule.72 But their basic vision of law shared a great deal
with that of Reconstruction-era Republicans. The changes to the
legal system in this era instituted reforms advocated since the end of
the Revolution. It is no coincidence that Democrats left them in
place when they took over after Reconstruction.73 That outcome, in
turn, lent an air of inevitability to earlier calls for reform; if
secessionists and unionists, slave holders and abolitionists, Democrats
and Republicans could all agree, then the legal system's trajectory
must have been set right from the beginning.
The state elite's prominence in the historical record owes as
much to their own efforts at self-preservation as it does to their
political importance. Their lives and work are easy to track because
they left such an impressive trail of sources. Joining their interest in
law to a keen sense of history, infused by notions of objectivity and
progress, they documented their own lives, collected the documents
of others, and created archives with the intent of leaving the "correct"
version of the past to posterity.74 Not only was the state elite prolific,
71. Thomas Ruffin provides one prominent example. The general point is that
advocacy of a professionalized, rational view of law did not necessarily imply support for
legal changes imposed by the Republican Party after the Civil War. Many secessionists
and Conservative Democrats were professionally trained lawyers.
72. See PAUL D. ESCOTr, MANY EXCELLENT PEOPLE: POWER AND PRIVILEGE IN
NORTH CAROLINA, 1850-1900, at 136-70 (1985).
73. Those accounts focusing on the development of the court usually note that
Democrats left these changes in place after they seized control of state government. See
sources cited supra note 8.
74. The efforts of Carolina lawyers to collect historical documents, particularly legal
documents, and to write history are discussed and documented in this section. For further
discussion of these issues, see EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE, supra note 3
(manuscript at 26-53). The best illustration of their efforts is in the effect on subsequent
historians, who relied on those materials and duplicated their presumptions, and who
routinely dismissed law and the legal process in the region as dysfunctional, backward, or
both. Southern legal historians have devoted a great deal of space to rehabilitating the
reputation of southern law and legal practitioners, beginning with Charles S. Sydnor, The
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but its members understood the importance of history and harnessed
it to serve their own ends. In this regard, the state elite in North
Carolina shared a great deal with the other state and national leaders
in their networks. As historian Joanne Freeman has argued, national
leaders of the early republic developed an acute sense of the power
they could wield through the historical record." In Freeman's
account, the interest in history was an extension of the partisan
political culture of the 1790s, which conflated personal reputation
with party affiliation.76 Through the genre of history, these men
vindicated their reputations and justified their political views after the
fact.
The state elite's version of history was decidedly Whiggish, often
informed by Revolutionary idealism. Such was the experience of
North Carolina printer Joseph Gales, whose publications consistently
promoted legal reform.77 Gales had been part of a radical group,
based in Sheffield, England, that advocated constitutional reform in
the 1780s and 1790s.7 ' After war broke out between France and
England in 1793, his organization came under suspicion, and Gales
Southerner and the Laws, 6 J. S. HIST. 3, 19-21 (1940) (explaining the source of legal
attitudes among Southerners). The issue is still an undercurrent in the scholarship, and it
helps explain why many southern legal historians have focused on those materials,
authored by reformers, that portray law in that region as an orderly system with an
intellectually consistent body of principles. The resulting work moved the field in
important directions, establishing southern law as a legitimate topic in its own right. See
sources cited supra note 13. Yet, in responding to past debates, this work has also
duplicated some of its underlying assumptions. Most notable is the presumption, long
held in southern history, that most matters involving slaves and, by extension, other
domestic dependents, were resolved on the plantation or within the household. For
examples of this approach, see generally AYERS, supra note 18; HINDUS, supra note 69;
PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, 1619-1877 (1993); and BERTRAM
WYAT-r-BROWN, SOUTHERN HONOR: ETHICS AND BEHAVIOR IN THE OLD SOUTH 362-
401 (1982). As a result, many southern historians looked everywhere but the legal system
for answers to basic questions about power and inequality in the region.
75. See JOANNE B. FREEMAN, AFFAIRS OF HONOR: NATIONAL POLITICS IN THE
NEW REPUBLIC 263-88 (2001).
76. Id.
77. For the content and direction of Gales' politics, see 2 DICTIONARY OF NORTH
CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY 265-67 (William S. Powell ed., 1979); W.H.G. Armytage, The
Editorial Experience of Joseph Gales, 1786-1794, 28 N.C. HIST. REV. 332, 332-61 (1951);
Seth Cotlar, Joseph Gales and the Making of the Jeffersonian Middle Class, in THE
REVOLUTION OF 1800: DEMOCRACY, RACE, AND THE NEW REPUBLIC 331-59 (James
Horn et al. eds., 2002); and Clement Eaton, Winifred and Joseph Gales: Liberals in the
Old South, 10 J. S. HIST. 461, 461-74 (1944). In addition to legal reform, Gales supported
a range of other causes, including libraries, internal improvements, education, penal
reform, and the American Colonization Society. Although opposed to slavery, he never
supported abolition openly while he lived in the South.
78. See Cotlar, supra note 77, at 331-33.
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was forced to leave the country to avoid arrest for treason." He re-
settled in Philadelphia, where he resumed his trade and aligned
himself with the Jeffersonian Republicans. 8° Impressed with his work,
the North Carolina congressional delegation approached him in 1798,
hoping to lure him to the state to promote the party's cause there.81
He did, setting up the Raleigh Register, which he eventually passed on
to his youngest son, Weston.82 Gales believed that the collection and
distribution of facts would achieve progressive change. One of his
particular interests was the law, which he saw as the necessary
foundation for the new republic.83 Not only did he support reforms to
centralize and systematize state law in the Raleigh Register, but he
also played a direct role in that effort by providing carefully rendered
volumes preserving legislative proceedings, constitutional debates,
statutes, and appellate decisions.84 His periodical, The Carolina Law
Repository, launched in 1813, thoroughly conflated legal reform and
progress, promising to keep "the Profession, and the citizens in
general . .. apprized of the progressive change and exposition of the
law."85
Like Gales, other legal reformers in the state elite tended to see
the past as prologue in a progressive journey that culminated in a
legal system defined by their principles, forming the essential
groundwork for their post-Revolutionary states. That was the
Revolution's legacy, earned through sacrifice and sanctioned in
blood. Relying heavily on temporal metaphors, legal reformers
characterized alternative versions of law as archaic relics of an
illogical and unenlightened time.86 Some, like Thomas Ruffin's good
friend, Archibald Murphey, looked to the past as a source of building
blocks for future progress.87 Murphey, a prominent lawyer with a
plantation in Orange County, known for his quick and creative
intellect, served as a circuit court judge and a representative to the
79. See id.
80. See id. at 340-41.
81. See id. at 343-44.
82. See id. at 347-50.
83. See id. at 349.
84. For biographical background on Gales, including support for all the facts
regarding his life in England, Philadelphia, and North Carolina, see sources cited supra
note 77.
85. RALEIGH REG., Jan. 29, 1813, at 4.
86. See sources cited supra note 70.
87. Archibald D. Murphey, His Memorial to the General Assembly of North
Carolina, Regarding His Projected History of North Carolina (Jan. 1, 1827), in Archibald
D. Murphey Papers (on file with the SHC, Wilson Library, The University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill).
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General Assembly. Like many of his friends, he dabbled in land
speculation and other money-making schemes, including the
short-lived North Carolina gold rush, although with much less success
than others. Murphey died broke, living on the charity of friends.
Yet it was his ebullient sense of optimism that brought him to that
end. He carried that enthusiasm into his political work, where his
efforts for judicial reform, internal improvements, and education
were outstripped only by his passion for history.88 "[I]n no state,"
Murphey wrote with the expansiveness that was his hallmark, "was a
more early or effectual opposition made to the encroachments of
power ... [or] were the principles of civil liberty better understood,
more ardently cherished, or more steadily defended."89 Since then,
"our legislature, our jurisprudence, and our institutions have kept
pace with the improvements of the age."9 In order for the state to
continue this progressive trajectory, Murphey concluded, it was
imperative that the legislature provide the means to collect and
preserve its historical documents. Murphey's view, however, was not
universal. Others viewed the past warily, seeing it primarily in terms
of defects that subsequent progress had overcome. Both positions,
however, resigned alternate versions of law to the dustbin of the past.
The state elite then wrote these views into their legal records and
narratives, shaping the historical record on which scholars now rely.
The number of reform-minded North Carolina lawyers in this group
who wrote history is remarkable. Joseph Gales's project, "History of
the Proceedings and Debates of the Early Sessions of Congress," is
but one example of this phenomenon.9 Like Gales, many wrote for a
88. For a description of Murphey's life, see generally R. D. W. CONNOR, STUDIES IN
NORTH CAROLINA HISTORY No. 3: ANTE-BELLUM BUILDERS OF NORTH CAROLINA
34-62 (N.C. Coll. For Women 1923) (1914); 1 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY,
supra note 33; and HERBERT SNIPES TURNER, THE DREAMER ARCHIBALD DEBOW
MURPHEY, 1777-1832 (1971).
89. Murphey, supra note 87, at 9.
90. Id.
91. See generally FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, THE HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA
FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD, at v (New Orleans, A. T. Penniman & Co. 1829) (writing
on a "historical inquiry into the discovery, settlement and improvement of the country...
on the shores of which the English made their first attempt toward colonization"); DAVID
L. SWAIN, BRITISH INVASION OF NORTH CAROLINA IN 1776: A LECTURE, DELIVERED
BEFORE THE HISTORICAL SOCIETY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
FRIDAY, APRIL 1ST, 1853, BY HON. DAVID L. SWAIN (1853) (discussing the historical
significance of the time period of the British invasion and "the subsequent career of
[Governor] Martin"); DAVID L. SWAIN, EARLY TIMES IN RALEIGH: ADDRESSES
DELIVERED BY THE HON. DAVID L. SWAIN, LL.D. AT THE DEDICATION OF TUCKER
HALL, AND ON THE OCCASION OF THE COMPLETION OF THE MONUMENT TO JACOB
JOHNSON (Raleigh, N.C., Walters, Hughes, & Co. 1867) (narrating the author's interest in
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national, not just a regional, audience, with the goal of preserving
their legacies by writing narratives that featured themselves, their
relatives, and their friends in starring roles.92 In 1827, for instance,
Chief Justice John Marshall, of the United States Supreme Court,
wrote to Archibald Murphey, praising his biographical sketches "of
the eminent men of North Carolina," most of whom were lawyers or
judges. 93 "It was my happiness to be acquainted with those of whom
you speak," wrote Marshall, "and I think you have given to the
character of each, its true coloring."94  Similar concerns led to a
friendly correspondence between Alexander Hamilton's son and
William Gaston, who sat on the North Carolina appellate court with
Ruffin. Hamilton's son, who was collecting his father's
correspondence and writing a biography, asked Gaston for
documents or personal recollections as well as an account of North
Carolina's credit laws, presumably for background about his father's
monetary policies.95  Gaston was happy to comply. The lives of
the early history of Raleigh, North Carolina, through tributes to important historical
events, public figures, and political changes). John Haywood, a prominent North Carolina
lawyer and legal writer who relocated to Tennessee, wrote about the "memorable
achievements of the eminent men of Tennessee" in THE CIVIL AND POLITICAL HISTORY
OF THE STATE OF TENNESSEE FROM ITS EARLIEST SETTLEMENT UP TO THE YEAR 1796;
INCLUDING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE STATE (Knoxville, Tenn., Heiskell & Brown
1823).
92. Examples of these narratives can be found in sources cited supra note 88.
93. Letter from Chief Justice John Marshall to Archibaid D. Murphey (Oct. 6, 1827),
in 1 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, supra note 33, at 365-66.
94. Id.
95. Letter from William Gaston to John C. Hamilton (Aug. 1, 1833), in William
Gaston Papers, supra note 18; Letter from William Gaston to John C. Hamilton (Aug. 30,
1833), in William Gaston Papers, supra note 18; Letter from John C. Hamilton to William
Gaston (Sept. 27, 1834), in William Gaston Papers, supra note 18. William Gaston's son-
in-law, Robert Donaldson, wanted to collect and publish Gaston's correspondence and
writings while he was still alive, but Gaston declined. Letter from William Gaston to
Robert Donaldson (Nov. 5, 1832), in William Gaston Papers, supra note 18. Gaston's
family members, though, did preserve their father's papers, as did the friends and relatives
of others in this group. For other examples of correspondence on the collection of
documents and historical information, see Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to Colonel
William Polk (July 16, 1819), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, supra note
33, at 147-48; Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to General Joseph Graham (Jan. 10,
1821), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, supra note 33, at 191-94; Letter
from Archibald D. Murphey to Colonel Ransom Sutherland (Mar. 8, 1821), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, supra note 33, at 194-97; Letter from Archibald D.
Murphey to General Joseph Graham (July 20, 1821), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D.
MURPHEY, supra note 33, at 211-13; and Letter from Allen J. Davie to Archibald D.
Murphey (Jan. 17, 1826), in 1 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, supra note 33,
at 327-29. All of this material, which was housed in state and university archives that
these same men and their families also supported, became the basis for later published
collections, many of which are cited in this Article.
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Archibald Murphey and William Gaston, as well as Thomas Ruffin
and other members of the state elite, were meticulously documented
in turn.96 It is no accident that historians have more information
about those involved in government at the state and national levels
than they do about people who were active in local communities. Nor
is it an accident that those men's confidence about the importance of
their interests, work, and lives echoes through the scholarship.
The state elite were also preoccupied with the collection of
documents and the recognition of those collections as authoritative
references on the past. Historians of Britain and Western Europe
have identified similar trends, in which the development of
professional history and the creation of archives were part and parcel
of the liberal project of nation building and the development of
empires. 97 Aware of the intellectual developments in Europe, North
Carolina's state elite consciously sought to duplicate them, but at
both the state and national level.9" The archives and histories of
European nations provided the inspiration for Archibald Murphey's
plans for a state archive and an eight-volume history of North
Carolina, which he grandiosely likened to Gibbon's Rise and Fall of
the Roman Empire.99 "The history of each of the European nations
has been long since written," he wrote in his request to the General
96. See generally 1-2 THE PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, supra note 33
(documenting collections of correspondence and other papers important to the life of
Archibald D. Murphey); 1-2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 21
(documenting, in multiple volumes, collections of correspondence and other papers
important to the life of Thomas Ruffin). William Gaston does not have a published
collection of his papers, but they were collected and housed at the Southern Historical
Collection, as were those of Thomas Ruffin.
97. North Carolina leaders were following European nations and their leaders in
creating-and, in some cases, capturing-existing archives and larger expressions of
national-or in the case of North Carolina, state-power. See SMITH, supra note 1, at
116-28; James Vernon, Narrating the Constitution: The Discourse of "the Real" and the
Fantasies of Nineteenth-Century Constitutional History, in RE-READING THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 204-06.
98. William Gaston was a "counsellor" in the American Antiquarian Society. Letter
from American Antiquarian Society to William Gaston (Feb. 4, 1824), in William Gaston
Papers, supra note 18. He also corresponded with George Bancroft about their mutual
interest in history. Letter from George Bancroft to William Gaston (Oct. 9, 1837), in
William Gaston Papers, supra note 18. David L. Swain, who served as governor and
president of the University of North Carolina, followed up on Murphey's archival project
described below. See generally DAVID L. SWAIN, REPORT OF THE HON. DAVID L.
SWAIN, LL.D., ON THE HISTORICAL AGENCY FOR PROCURING DOCUMENTARY
EVIDENCE OF THE HISTORY OF NORTH-CAROLINA (Raleigh, N.C., Holden & Wilson
1857) (discussing the concerted efforts undertaken to accurately account for historical
events relating to North Carolina).
99. Murphey, supra note 87.
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Assembly for funding."' 0 North Carolina needed to follow their
example if it hoped to keep up. In addition to collecting records from
the colonial and Revolutionary eras, Murphey proposed the ongoing
preservation and organization of all documents related to state
business, especially those related to the legal system. 1'
Murphey's project was ambitious, but not unusual. Legal
reformers in other states also began collecting documents related to
law and colonial governance immediately following the Revolution. 102
As reformers realized, historical documentation was crucial to the
task of creating a definite, systematic body of state law. It was
impossible to identify a specific corpus of laws as the official
expression of the state without a supporting body of historical
documents to legitimize and perpetuate it. The materials, if they
existed at all, were either in British archives or in private hands.10 3
Most states, for instance, entered the post-Revolutionary period
with a complete record of colonial statutes. 1"4  Like legislatures
elsewhere, the North Carolina legislature provided for the printing of
statutes in pamphlet form following each session, and local
newspapers often reprinted the results in their columns. But, like
legislatures elsewhere, the North Carolina General Assembly had not
archived the laws it passed."0 In Virginia, St. George Tucker failed in
his efforts to obtain a full set of session laws. "Few gentlemen, even
of the [legal] profession," he declared in 1803, "have ever been able
to boast of possessing a complete collection of its laws."'0 6 Persisting,
Tucker managed to pull together an updated version of Blackstone's
Commentaries specifically for Virginia, meshing Blackstone's version
of common law with Virginia case law and statutes.' 7
100. Id.
101. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
102. For the general trend of collecting legal materials, see COOK, supra note 7, at 6-7.
Virginia's post-Revolutionary statute collection is one example. See, e.g., ZEPHANIAH
SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT (Windham, Conn.,
John Byrne 1795); ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES
OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND ITS LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, at
iv (Philadelphia, William Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803).
103. Archibald Murphey made the point in his effort to get the state legislature to fund
a history of North Carolina. See Murphey, supra note 87.
104. See COOK, supra note 7, at 6-7.
105. The absence of such materials was why North Carolina lawyers and editors put
together private editions. See infra notes 108-10.
106. TUCKER, supra note 102, at iv.
107. See id. at iii-xviii.
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The difficulties in tracking down and using statutes created
barriers that encouraged those with less invested in these references
to dispense with them altogether. So reformers produced easy-to-use,
single-volume digests of North Carolina's statutes. John Haywood's
A Manual of the Laws of North Carolina, for instance, boasted
accessibility in its subtitle, with "distinct heads, in alphabetical order"
and "references from one head to another."' 18 Prominent members of
the state elite oversaw such projects, largely because it was they who
pushed for them and who had the most invested in the idea. In 1791,
James Iredell, Sr., who became a U.S. Supreme Court justice, put
together the state's first collection.1 °9 The legislature provided for
new editions periodically, including a revisal in 1837, prepared by a
committee of three, including James Iredell, Jr., who followed in his
father's footsteps.'
If anything, ascertaining the current state of case law was even
more difficult than compiling statutes. Since judges did not routinely
write down their decisions or keep them when they did, opinions from
the colonial as well as the post-Revolutionary courts often had to be
reconstructed long after the fact."' Frangois-Xavier Martin, one of
the state's most prolific printers of legal material, published notes in
108. JOHN HAYWOOD, A MANUAL OF THE LAWS OF NORTH CAROLINA:
ARRANGED UNDER DISTINCT HEADS, IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER WITH REFERENCES
FROM ONE HEAD TO ANOTHER, WHEN A SUBJECT IS MENTIONED IN ANY OTHER PART
OF THE BOOK THAN UNDER THE DISTINCT HEAD TO WHICH IT BELONGS (Raleigh,
N.C., J. Gales 1801).
109. See JAMES IREDELL, LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA: PUBLISHED,
ACCORDING TO ACT OF ASSEMBLY (Edenton, N.C., Hodge & Willis 1791).
110. After James Iredell's 1791 digest, John Haywood published an edition in 1801 that
was subsequently updated in 1808, 1814, and 1819. The legislature provided for a new
revisal published in 1821, which was updated by John L. Taylor in 1827. See JOHN L.
TAYLOR ET AL., LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA: INCLUDING THE TITLES
OF SUCH STATUTES AND PARTS OF STATUTES OF GREAT BRITAIN AS ARE IN FORCE IN
SAID STATE (Raleigh, N.C, J. Gales 1821); JOHN L. TAYLOR, A REVISAL OF THE LAWS
OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA: PASSED FROM 1821-1825 WITH MARGINAL
NOTES AND REFERENCES (Raleigh, N.C., J. Gales 1827); FREDERICK NASH ET AL., THE
REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA PASSED BY THE GENERAL
ASSEMBLY AT THE SESSION OF 1836-7 (Raleigh, N.C., Turner & Hughes 1837).
Subsequently, James Iredell, Jr., oversaw another updated digest. See JAMES IREDELL, A
NEW DIGESTED MANUAL OF THE ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH
CAROLINA FROM THE YEAR 1838 TO THE YEAR 1850, INCLUSIVE (Raleigh, N.C., Seaton
Gales 1851).
111. The legislature provided for the appointment of a court reporter in 1818. See
RALEIGH REG., Jan. 1, 1819, at 1. Until then, the documenting and collecting of judges'
opinions was done more informally. Some judges recorded and some did not, as is clear
from later discussions about the need to publish decisions. See 1 THE PAPERS OF
ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, supra note 33, at 169-70 (recounting Archibald Murphey's
admonitions to Judge Thomas Ruffin in 1820 to write out more of his decisions).
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1797 on selected decisions in the state's superior courts, then the
highest level of the system.'1 2 John L. Taylor, a superior court judge
who oversaw a compilation of the revised statutes, published a series
of volumes on higher court decisions between 1798 and 1802.13
Between 1799 and 1806, John Haywood, another avid legal compiler,
put together an additional collection."' Thereafter, collections
continued to appear irregularly, often at wide intervals, when the
appointed court reporters found the time to put them together."5
112. See, e.g., FRANCOIS-XAVIER MARTIN, NOTES OF A FEW DECISIONS IN THE
SUPERIOR COURTS OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA AND IN THE CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES FOR NORTH-CAROLINA DISTRICT (Newbern, N.C., Winston &
Stewart 1797). The enthusiasm and reach of Franqois-Xavier Martin's efforts was typical.
A printer, lawyer, and French 6migrd, Martin published the North-Carolina Gazette and
augmented collections issued by the legislature with his own compilations. For
background on Martin, see 4 DICTIONARY OF NORTH CAROLINA BIOGRAPHY, supra
note 77, at 225. Typical of his enthusiasm is an ad in his North-Carolina Gazette that
announced the publication of his collection of private acts, which had been left out of
Iredell's 1791 collection of statutes; Martin thought these too valuable to be lost. See
Subscription for a Publication of the Private Acts of the General Assembly of North-
Carolina, NORTH-CAROLINA GAZETTE, Feb. 8, 1794, at 1. For the results of his work, see
generally A COLLECTION OF THE PRIVATE ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA FROM THE YEAR 1715 TO THE YEAR 1790 (Newbern, N.C.,
Franqois-Xavier Martin ed., 1794); THE ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA: PASSED DURING THE SESSIONS HELD IN THE YEARS
1791, 1792, 1793, AND 1794 (Newbern, N.C., Franqois-Xavier Martin ed., 1795); and JAMES
IREDELL, PUBLIC ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF NORTH CAROLINA (Newbern,
N.C., Martin & Ogden ed., 1804).
113. See JOHN LOUIS TAYLOR, CASES DETERMINED IN THE SUPERIOR COURTS OF
LAW AND EQUITY OF THE STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA (Newbern, N.C., Martin &
Ogden 1802).
114. See JOHN HAYWOOD, REPORTS OF CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR
COURTS OF LAW AND EQUITY OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA: FROM THE YEAR
1789 TO THE YEAR 1806 (Halifax, N.C., Abraham Hodge 1806).
115. See, e.g., DUNCAN CAMERON & WILLIAM NORWOOD, REPORTS OF CASES
RULED AND DETERMINED BY THE COURT OF CONFERENCE OF NORTH CAROLINA
(Raleigh, N.C., J. Gales 1805); 1-3 ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA: FROM THE
YEAR 1804 TO THE YEAR 1819, INCLUSIVE (Raleigh, N.C., J. Gales & Son 1821-1826);
JOHN LOUIS TAYLOR, CASES ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH
CAROLINA FROM JULY TERM 1816 TO JANUARY TERM 1818, INCLUSIVE (Raleigh, N.C.,
J. Gales 1818); 1-4 THOMAS RUFFIN & FRANCIS L. HAWKS, REPORTS OF CASES
ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA: DURING
THE YEARS 1820 & 1821 (Raleigh, N.C., J. Gales & Son 1823-1828); 1-4 THOMAS P.
DEVEREUX, CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH
CAROLINA: FROM DECEMBER TERM 1826, TO JUNE TERM 1834 (Raleigh, N.C., J. Gales
and Son 1829-1836); 1-2 THOMAS P. DEVEREUX, EQUITY CASES ARGUED AND
DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH-CAROLINA (Raleigh, N.C., J. Gales
and Son 1831-1836); 1-4 THOMAS P. DEVEREUX & WILLIAM H. BATTLE, REPORTS OF
CASES AT LAW ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH
CAROLINA (Raleigh, N.C., P. H. Nicklin & T. Johnson 1837-1840).
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When Thomas Ruffin took over for a term as North Carolina court
reporter in 1820, Archibald Murphey warned him about the difficulty
of getting written opinions from judges.116 "I told Judge Henderson,
it was essential to the Character of the Court that he should write
more Opinions," chided Murphey." 7 Unfortunately for the less
vigilant Leonard Henderson, Murphey had no intention of letting the
matter go; he promised Ruffin to follow up and write Henderson
again.118 Like Murphey, Ruffin proved to be a reliable, thorough
reporter who took particular care in writing out his own opinions-
much more so than many other jurists. In fact, Ruffin's attention to
this task explains why his opinions became so influential, both outside
the state and, later, as precedents within the body of North Carolina
law. He made sure to leave his thoughts on paper for posterity,
where other jurists did not.
The resulting volumes of appellate decisions were not just
compilations of facts. These volumes forced existing laws into a
unitary body, creating the impression of orderly progress over time-
or, at least, identifying a point at which such orderly process began.
Order had a price. These collections, even when sanctioned by the
state legislatures, were all penned with a heavy editorial hand. They
contained selected material and elevated certain statutes and
decisions as authoritative legal guides when competing ones still
existed. The selection and organization, combined with
accompanying annotations, smoothed over the contradictions by
presenting statutes and cases as a logical development of particular
ideas over time, artificially deriving consensus and certainty from a
legal culture that actually led in multiple, often conflicting directions.
That order was framed in terms of the concerns of those in the
immediate present who wrote the volumes. Not until legislatures
made key changes in the structure of the legal system, of which these
compilations were a part, did the legal system in North Carolina
provide a way to reconcile judges' conflicting decisions or to elevate
one decision over another as "the" law that should guide future
cases. 119  These contradictions were not eliminated until state
legislatures revised and reconciled their statutes and issued edited
116. Letter from Archibald D. Murphey to Thomas Ruffin (Aug. 4, 1820), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF ARCHIBALD D. MURPHEY, supra note 33, at 169-70. The letter indicates that
Ruffin was taking over this role. Id.
117. Id. at 170.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting the institutional changes in the
legal system that created an appellate court with precedent setting power and elevated
that court over local jurisdiction).
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reports of decisions in law and equity. 2 ' In fact, all the variations and
conflicts that these volumes tried to explain away were part of state
law. These compilations tried to create an authoritative version of
the law within legal systems where no such version actually existed.
Later editing conducted by members of the state elite
contributed to the illusion of regularity and uniformity. In 1868, as
part of the effort to institutionalize legal changes of the kind
promoted by antebellum reformers, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina renumbered all the previous volumes of reports from the
higher courts consecutively.121 All the original records were later
housed together, as a single record group, in the state archives. 2 2 The
results merged material from high courts that, in their various
iterations, actually had different functions and powers. This merging
obscured differences in the authority and reach of earlier and later
decisions, while also creating the appearance that reports of decisions
had been issued regularly. One edition of the volume now designated
as the first in the series of North Carolina reports, for instance, is a
highly edited blend of Martin's notes, Taylor's volumes, what
remained of the court records, the notes of William H. Battle, who
was a judge and court reporter in the 1840s, and the annotations of
Walter Clark, the Progressive Era lawyer who put the volume
together.1
2 1
III. THE IMPACT OF LOCALISM AND UNIFICATION ON SLAVE LAW
Acknowledging the state elite's influence over both the archival
records and the resulting historical narratives changes the basic
categories of analysis. This perspective upends basic
historiographical assumptions, revealing the artificiality of
frameworks that categorize local matters in this period as historically
marginal while elevating the business of other state institutions as
120. See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text (referring to institutional changes
that resulted from legislative collection and revision of statutes).
121. See CHARLES C. SOULE, THE LAWYER'S REFERENCE MANUAL OF LAW BOOKS
AND CITATIONS 47 (Boston, Soule & Bugbee 1883) ("By order of the Supreme Court, the
reports from the time of the adoption of the new Constitution of 1868 (which abolished
the distinction between actions at law and suits in equity) have been entitled simply 'North
Carolina reports.' In calculating the number [63] of the first volume issued under this
name, the latest edition of the early reports and of Winston have been taken as the
standard, and the volumes have been counted as now bound, and not as originally
published."). It is also clearly stated in the edited volumes. See, e.g., Preface, 1 N.C. 5, 5
(1778-1804).
122. State Supreme Court Records, Original Records, North Carolina Office of
Archives and History, Raleigh.
123. Preface, 1 N.C. 5, 5 (1778-1804).
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central. More importantly, it reveals the logic that governed most
public offenses, which were matters that covered an incredibly wide
range of issues, most of which were handled at the local level.
Localized law determined public offenses through the collective
interests of the peace, not the logic of individual rights."4 The peace
not only gave people without rights-notably slaves-a place within
the legal system, but also allowed legal officials to recognize those
people's interests without altering their legal status.125 It was this
logic, and the legal practices it supported, that the state elite hoped to
discredit and replace.
The peace was inclusive only in the sense that it was an equal
opportunity enforcer, enclosing everyone in its patriarchal embrace
and raising its collective interests over those of any given individual.
Yet it was precisely because the patriarchal peace combined rigid
hierarchy with coercive inclusion that subordinates, even slaves, could
play active roles in the system. They could trump the authority of
their immediate patriarchs by appealing to the higher patriarchal
authority of the peace.2 6 Slaves, free blacks, and white wives and
children who could not testify, for instance, could and did give
information that initiated cases and shaped their outcome.'27 Even
when they could not prosecute cases in their own names, they made
complaints that resulted in prosecutions and convictions for their
injuries. In such instances, subordinates did not use the law in their
own right.'28 When legal officials acted on such information and
complaints, they did so by invoking the larger interests of the peace.
124. Magistrate's manuals, the legal source most in use at the local level, judged
offenses through the logic of the "peace." See, e.g., HAYWOOD, supra note 20, at 115.
125. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
126. Typical was John Haywood's North Carolina magistrate's manual, published in
1808, which identified the "peace" as "a quiet and harmless behavior towards the
government, and all the citizens under its protection." HAYWOOD, supra note 20, at 191.
The substitution of "citizen" for "subject" was more a Revolutionary flourish than a
substantive change, since the manual explicitly included domestic dependents and other
subordinate groups, including free blacks and slaves, within the peace; not only were they
accountable to law, but they were also under its protection. Separate entries in justices'
manuals covered every conceivable legal category of people, including wives, widows,
women, children, wards, students, free blacks, slaves, Indians, and servants. While
including all those people within the peace, the entries also made the hierarchical structure
abundantly clear, by focusing on the restrictions unique to those in each legal category.
127. For more discussion of this, see Edwards, Enslaved Women and the Law, supra
note 3, at 314-16; and Edwards, Status Without Rights, supra note 3, at 373-76.
128. See Edwards, Enslaved Women and the Law, supra note 3, at 314-16; Edwards,
Status Without Rights, supra note 3, at 373-76. Magistrate's manuals also allowed
subordinates to provide information about public offenses and court officials to intercede
on their behalf. The dynamics described in this paragraph are drawn from the sources
cited in note 20.
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The source of the information was irrelevant if the peace was
threatened. Those dynamics were particularly evident in cases
involving injured subordinates, including slaves, who were unable to
prosecute in their own names. Although the injury was to a specific
individual, officials prosecuted by making the legal offense the
theoretical damage to the peace, in its guise as the metaphorical
public body. The injured peace thus replaced the actual victim and
prosecuted the case. At issue was who could act in law. The
metaphorical public body could do so when the actual, corporal
bodies of subordinates could not. This legal form erased injured
subordinates only in theory. In practice, they still remained central
because the damage to the public body was done through their flesh
and blood. Always present, yet unacknowledged, this convenient
legal fiction allowed subordinates a central role in the legal order,
without disturbing the hierarchies that also defined it.'29
For those outside the tight circles of local knowledge that shaped
these cases, the outcomes can seem arbitrary. The substance of the
peace always remained slippery-and purposefully so-defined as it
was in specific areas, at distinct moments in time, and through the
particular relationships of the people there. In those contexts, local
officials sometimes used the peace to intercede on behalf of
subordinates, even slaves.130 The concept thus accounts for an array
of cases in local courts-such as cases against white men for incest,
child abuse, wife-beating, and violence against slaves as well as
acquittals of accused slaves-that have mystified scholars because
they seem at odds with the racial, class, and gender hierarchies that
defined social relations at the time.' At other times, though, local
officials used the peace either to look the other way or to legitimize
vigilante violence against the accused, a practice to which those on
the social margins, particularly slaves, were vulnerable.'32 Why did
129. For the dynamics and logic of these cases, see Edwards, Enslaved Women and the
Law, supra note 3, at 314-16; and Edwards, Status Without Rights, supra note 3, at 373-76.
130. See Edwards, Enslaved Women and the Law, supra note 3, at 314-16; Edwards,
Status Without Rights, supra note 3, at 373-76; see also EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND
THEIR PEACE, supra note 3 (manuscript at 105-07).
131. For examples of scholarship that address the existence of cases where white
leaders at the local and state level supported unlikely defendants-slaves, free blacks,
poor whites, and poor women of both races without strong family ties-see DIANE
MILLER SOMMERVILLE, RAPE AND RACE IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 95,
132, 180-81 (2004); and Peter Bardaglio, Rape and the Law in the Old South: "Calculated
to Excite Indignation in Every Heart," 60 J. S. HIST. 749, 749-72 (1994).
132. The scholarship that establishes the harsh discipline meted out to slaves, in
particular, is extensive. See, e.g., AYERS, supra note 18, at 102-03, 133, 155; HINDUS,
supra note 69, at xix, xxvii, 34. For the difficulties faced by poor women of both races in
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whites occasionally rally to the defense of certain slaves? Why did
they ignore the offenses against certain white men? The answers lie
less in the abstractions of race, gender, class, or rights and more in the
networks of personalized information that made up the peace and
that are now lost to the historical record.'33
Whatever the outcome, these complaints did not alter the legal
status of the individuals involved. Local officials considered
complaints on a case-by-case basis, righting specific wrongs done to
the metaphorical public body, without extending or denying rights to
any category of individuals. The interests of the peace thus drew
unique boundaries around each case, circumscribing the legal
implications for the rights and status of the people involved. The
individual rights of those involved were not at issue; it was the good
order of the peace that governed the cases. Acting on behalf of the
peace, local officials could follow up on the complaints of one white
wife or one enslaved woman. They could undercut the domestic
authority of one husband or one master. But those circumstantial
assessments did not translate into universal statements about the
rights of all wives, all slaves, all husbands, or all masters in all like
conditions. That was because such cases were about the peace, not
the rights of the individuals involved. The logic emphasized the
collective order rather than specific individuals within it. In the name
the legal system, see VICTORIA BYNUM, UNRULY WOMEN: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL
AND SEXUAL CONTROL IN THE OLD SOUTH 1-4 (1992).
133. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. The concept of credit was crucial to
deliberations about who would receive consideration in the legal system and who would
not. External indices of social status-such as gender, race, age, and property-all figured
prominently in establishing credit, just as they had for centuries in the legal culture of both
England and continental Europe. But they provided only the starting point. What
determined any given individual's credit was specific knowledge about that person,
disseminated through the exchange of gossip among those who knew them. The personal
and impersonal aspects of credit worked together, creating a unique balance in each
instance. That was why local courts routinely included testimony about the reputations of
witnesses as well as defendants and victims, if their information was crucial to the case.
Such character witnesses were believed necessary to establish the reliability of key
accounts, a practice that suggests the personal connotations of credit. Who someone was,
at a very personal level, was essential in evaluating what they said in court-and
determining the implications and consequences of what they were judged to have done.
Credit, then, carried over into the legal evaluation of other kinds of information. For
examples of the functioning of credit within the legal process, see LAURA GOWING,
DOMESTIC DANGERS: WOMEN, WORDS, AND SEX IN EARLY MODERN LONDON 50-52,
232-62 (1996); and CYNTHIA B. HERRUP, A HOUSE IN GROSS DISORDER: SEX, LAW,
AND THE 2ND EARL OF CASTLEHAVEN 78-80, 110-11 (1999). See also BARBARA
SHAPIRO, "BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT" AND "PROBABLE CAUSE": HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 6-12, 114-85 (1991)
(explaining the use of credit in evaluating testimony).
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of the peace, subordinates could move out from under the legal
purview of their household heads and acquire a more direct
relationship to the legal system."'
Until the 1820s, state lawmakers tended to affirm local practice
and its expansive use of the peace, at least in the area of public law.
Even statutory changes in slave law followed this pattern, with
legislators affirming the extension of the peace to slaves in certain
instances. In 1791, the North Carolina legislature made the willful
killing of a slave murder unless it resulted from moderate correction,
legal discretion that was allowed household heads over all their
dependents. 35 The statute's preamble drew heavily on Revolutionary
language, declaring that the previous "distinction of criminality
between the murder of a white person and one who is equally an [sic]
human creature, but merely of a different complexion, is disgraceful
to humanity and degrading in the highest degree to the laws and
principles of a free, christian, and enlightened country."'36 In 1817,
the legislature extended the peace further, making the crime of
manslaughter applicable to instances in which the victim was a
slave.3 7 These statutes, however, affirmed rather than modified local
practice, which already applied common law precepts to cases
involving slaves.'38 Even acts that granted slaves procedural rights
tended to buttress local practice, by easing the difficulties of trying
slaves and cases involving slaves in a system where process was so
important.
The early appellate court also followed local practice in key
respects. The central issue in State v. Boon,' 39 an 1801 appellate
ruling that criticized the 1791 statute criminalizing the killing of slaves
134. The analysis in this paragraph is based not only on local court records, see supra
note 26, but also on the relationship between those cases and state appellate decisions:
The legal implications of local cases were confined to the cases at hand, a situation
that reform-minded state lawmakers tried to remedy throughout the period
between the Revolution and the Civil War in a number of ways: by abolishing
courts of conference, which reviewed problematic cases, offered suggestions, and
then returned them to the district courts; by replacing it with an appellate court; by
strengthening the appellate court's power to set precedent; and by elevating both
appellate decisions and statutes as a single consistent, authoritative body of law
that applied throughout the state.
Edwards, Status Without Rights, supra note 3, at 385 n.44.
135. HAYWOOD, supra note 108, at 530-31, 543.
136. Id. at 530.
137. 1817 N.C. Sess. Laws 18-19.
138. See sources cited supra note 13.
139. 1 N.C. (Tay) 191 (1801), superseded by statute, Act of Feb. 11, 1893, ch. 85, 1893
N.C. Sess. Laws 76 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2007)).
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as too ambiguous to enforce, was not whether slaves were included in
the peace, but how that was accomplished in the theoretical terms of
law.14° Judge Hall argued that common law protections that applied
to other subjects did not automatically extend to slaves. Drawing a
connection between common law and the peace, he reasoned that
slaves lived under the dominion of their masters, not under that of the
peace, because slavery did not exist within common law." For slaves
to be brought into the peace, common law protections had to be
enacted through statute.142 As Hall saw it, the problem in this case
was that the 1791 statute was too vague to accomplish that goal.
43
While agreeing with Hall on the inadequacy of the statute, Judge
John Louis Taylor took the opportunity to advocate the
criminalization of violence against slaves in broader, more general
terms. "What is the definition of murder," he wrote, but "[t]he
unlawful killing of a reasonable creature within the peace of the State,
with malice aforethought?"'" "A slave is a reasonable creature," he
continued, "may be within the peace, and is under the protection of
the State, and may become the victim of preconceived malice."' 45
Judge Samuel Johnston went further, arguing that the murder of a
slave was more "atrocious and barbarous ... than killing a person
who is free, and on an equal footing.' ' 146 "It is an evidence of a most
depraved and cruel disposition to murder one so much in your power
that he is incapable of making resistance, even in his own defense
.... " ,47 In such incidents, the legal system needed to step in,
discipline the offender, and restore order. Significantly, the judges
who were most outspoken in their defense of slaves' interests couched
their arguments in terms of slaves' place within the peace, not their
rights as individuals. 48
The influence of the peace, as defined in localized law, also
explains many apparent legal anomalies at the state level. Consider
the 1798 case of State v. Weaver, 141 which appears in John Haywood's
compilation of early North Carolina appellate decisions. Weaver




143. Id. at 193.
144. Id. at 199.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 198.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 54 (1798) (per curiam).
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Boon, although none of the opinions in Boon mentioned it, even to
dismiss it. 5° The decision in Weaver began with an analogy between
free servants and slaves: "[I]f a free servant refuses to obey ... and
the master endeavor to exact obedience by force, and the servant
offers to resist by force ... and the master kills, it is not murder, nor
even manslaughter, but justifiable [homicide]."'' A master's use of
force was "much more ... justifiable" when directed against slaves,
who were more completely subordinated than free servants.'52
The legal context of the 1790s, however, shaped the meaning and
limited the applicability of the Weaver opinion. At that time, the
North Carolina appellate court was still a court of conference, which
advised judges in local jurisdictions on especially difficult cases; it did
not lay down rules that justices elsewhere were supposed to follow in
other cases.'53 Moreover, the published opinion in Weaver was not
really a decision at all, even though it later passed as precedent.
Rather, the text seems to have been jury instructions given by John
Haywood, the compiler, who was then a district judge.'54 It did not
involve the rights of all masters and all slaves, as Haywood's
presentation of the case implied, but the use of force by a specific
master, Mr. Scott, against a specific slave, Lewis.'55 Following Judge
Haywood's instruction, the jury acquitted Scott.156 At the time, given
the discretionary power of localized law, Scott's use of force was
contingent, based in local context and exercised on behalf of the
peace.
In the 1820s, after legal institutions at the state level had
acquired more authority, legislators and jurists began importing the
logic of property law into public matters. In so doing, they replaced
subjects of the peace, with their distinctive personalities and
entangling relationships, with the theoretically uniform bodies of
rights-bearing individuals. From that point, they moved outward,
using the rights of these abstract individuals to redefine the peace.
When reformers and state-level jurists invoked the peace, they meant
not the inclusive domain occupied by the idiosyncratic and
interconnected subjects of previous generations and localized law, but
a collectivity composed of theoretically autonomous, rights-bearing
150. Id. at 78; Boon, 1 N.C. (Tay.) at 195-200.
151. Weaver, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) at 54.
152. Id.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
154. See Weaver, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) at 54.
155. See id. at 54-55.
156. Id.; MORRIS, supra note 68, at 161-81.
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individuals who owned property. The possession of rights, construed
as a form of property, became the primary route to the legal
protections of the peace.
The results of this conversion are strikingly apparent in matters
of interpersonal violence involving subordinates, particularly slaves.
In these cases, state lawmakers treated the legal protections
traditionally granted to all subjects under the peace as rights. Once
construed as rights, judges began refusing those protections to
domestic dependents on the basis that they would endanger
husbands' and masters' domestic authority.'57 The legal effect was to
privatize domestic relations by uprooting household heads' authority
from its place within the peace and turning it into a right that legally
recognized individuals exercised over their property. All domestic
dependents were repositioned as the subjects of their household
heads, instead of subjects of the peace."' But the implications were
most dramatic for slaves, the most marginalized of subjects and the
least able to summon the protections of the peace.
The 1823 case of State v. Reed,159 which involved a white man
convicted of manslaughter for killing a slave, captures the essence of
this transition. Reed recapitulated the major questions in the earlier
1801 case, State v. Boon: whether slaves were part of the peace, and
whether fatal violence against them could be tried under common
law. Two of the three judges in Reed, John Louis Taylor and John
Hall, had also issued opinions in Boon.60 In 1823, though, they sat on
the newly constituted Supreme Court of North Carolina, composed of
three judges who only heard appeals, instead of the North Carolina
Court of Conference, which had included all the judges who tried
cases in district courts.1 6' Both Taylor and Hall wrote short opinions
reaffirming their decisions in Boon,162 taking different positions on
how to include slaves within the peace.163 Hall placed slaves outside
the bounds of the peace and common law unless the legislature
157. See, e.g., State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 265-66 (1829); State v. Reed, 9 N.C.
(2 Hawks) 454, 456 (1823).
158. See EDWARDS, THE PEOPLE AND THEIR PEACE, supra note 3 (manuscript at
238-44).
159. 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 454 (1823).
160. See State v. Boon, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 191,191,199 (1801).
161. For the institutional structure of the court, see sources cited supra note 8.
162. See Reed, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 455-56.
163. See Boon, 1 N.C. (Tay.) at 197-98.
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specified otherwise."6 Taylor, who assumed slaves' position within
the peace, thought common law applicable to them. a65
Although Judge Leonard Henderson sided with Taylor in Reed,
his opinion cast the issue differently by raising the question of
whether slaves' position as property severed their ties to the peace
and their access to the protections of the state, be it through common
law or statute. "That a slave is a reasonable, or, more properly, a
human being, is not, I suppose, denied," wrote Henderson.'66 "But it
is said that, being property, he is not within the protection of the law
.... ,167 After stating the hypothetical that slaves' position as
property excluded them from all legal protections, Henderson
rejected it, but only in regard to fatal violence because, no one, not
even masters, had power over slaves' lives.16 Henderson indicated in
his opinion that there is no law in North Carolina, or any other state,
"by which the life of a slave is placed at the disposal of his master.' '169
Even so, Henderson conceded that masters' property rights shielded
them from legal intervention in every other respect: the law "vested
in the master the absolute and uncontrolled right to the services of
the slave, and the means of enforcing those services .... , 170 In those
areas, "the law has nothing to do" with and will not "interfere upon
the ground that the State's rights, and not the master's, have been
violated.' 171 Property rights privatized the institution of slavery.
Subsequent cases followed that logic, with Thomas Ruffin's
decisions providing some of the most famous and the most graphic
examples. Ruffin is rarely placed in the vanguard of change,
particularly change that expanded the legal reach of individual rights.
His decisions can be interpreted as those of a paternalist who
defended slavery and marriage as organic relationships defined
through the reciprocal obligations of master and slave, husband and
wife. 72  That is partly because of the success of the state elite in
164. See id. at 199.
165. Id.
166. Reed, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 455.
167. Id.
168. See id. at 445-56.
169. Id. at 456.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See GENOVESE, supra note 69, at 25-49. Genovese also discusses the link
between slavery and other domestic relations of subordination that grounded the
paternalistic ethic. Id. at 70-75. Drawing on that framework, historians tended to see
Ruffin's decisions on slavery-and State v. Mann in particular-as exemplary of Ruffin's
paternalism and his embrace of an organic view of marriage based in status rather than
contract. See BARDAGLIO, supra note 13, at 63-64; BYNUM, supra note 132, at 69-71.
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preserving their vision of the legal system and characterizing it as the
inevitable outcome of venerable traditions rooted in the past. Ruffin
also cultivated that association with a mythic past in his opinions by
using historically resonant analogies to legitimize legal change. By
nineteenth-century standards, though, Ruffin was a thoroughly
modern jurist, a Whig who saw individual initiative, the unfettered
control of property, and economic development as the key to the
nation's future and whose decisions in matters of property reflected
those commitments. In his decisions on marriage and slavery,
much-cited by historians, Ruffin remade those status relations by
infusing them with the logic of property rights.'73
Ruffin's commitment to property rights guided his most
infamous ruling in 1829 in State v. Mann.174 Those concerns led him
to define the defendant, John Mann, as a master, even though he only
hired, rather than owned, Lydia, the injured slave. 175 As Ruffin saw
it, property rights trumped status and placed hirers, whose authority
over slaves was established through a contract giving them temporary
property rights, in the same position as owners, whose authority could
be rooted in the status relationship of master and slave. 176 Although
this aspect of the decision has received a great deal of scholarly
attention, the legal practice of granting hirers the authority of masters
was well established: in the 1798 case of State v. Weaver, for instance,
both the district court and the state court of conference treated the
defendant, a slave hirer, as if he were a master.77 More novel was the
way Ruffin departed from the logic of status, forcing the relationship
between master and slave or hirer and slave into the zero-sum
equation of competing individual rights. In one of his most notorious
pronouncements, Ruffin declared that "[t]he power of the master
must be absolute to render the submission of the slave perfect.' 1 78 By
making the power of a master absolute, Ruffin turned it into an
individual right, rather than the product of a status relationship
173. See TIMOTHY S. HUEBNER, THE SOUTHERN JUDICIAL TRADITION: STATE
JUDGES AND SECTIONAL DISTINCTIVENESS, 1790-1890, at 130-59 (1999). Ruffin's
political positions are apparent in his published, collected correspondences. See generally
1 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS RUFFIN, supra note 21 (collecting assorted papers sent from
and addressed to Thomas Ruffin).
174. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
175. See id. at 264-65.
176. Id. at 265 ("In a criminal proceeding, and indeed in reference to all other persons
but the general owner, the hirer and possessor of a slave, in a relation to both rights and
duties, is, for the time being, the owner.").
177. State v. Weaver, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 54, 55 (1797) (per curiam).
178. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 266.
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extended at the behest of the peace with the intent of maintaining
public order. In removing an individual master's authority from its
place within the peace, Ruffin also freed it from legal contingency and
regulation. It became absolute, akin to other property rights that the
state was bound to protect. By implication, legal intervention on
behalf of Lydia might jeopardize the rights of all masters. "The
danger would be great, indeed," Ruffin concluded, "if the tribunals of
justice should be called on to graduate the punishment appropriate to
every temper and every dereliction of menial duty." '179 The universal
basis of the property rights held by masters limited the jurisdiction of
the state over their conduct toward slaves.
Ten years later, in State v. Hoover, 8 0 Ruffin seemed to backtrack
from this extreme position.' In this 1839 opinion, Ruffin argued that
a master's authority was not so complete that he could take a slave's
life at will.'82 But he still interpreted status relations through the lens
of individual rights, just as he had in Mann. He began by reiterating
the central point in Mann, that a master's authority to "lawfully
punish his slave" was a right that "must, in general, be left to his own
judgment and humanity, and cannot be judicially questioned."'83 The
difference in the Hoover case, according to Ruffin, was that violence
had become so chronic and so brutal that it ceased to be
punishment."8 "They are barbarities" that "do not belong to a state
of civilization," so they "cannot be fairly attributed to an intention to
correct or to chastise."' 85 Ruffin did not need to appeal to the peace
to justify legal intervention, because his argument hinged on the
contention that John Hoover had ceased to act as a master should in
his relationship with the slave Mira."8 6 Therefore, his authority over
Mira was no longer a right that the law was bound to protect. 187 The
court could punish him as a man who committed murder rather than a
179. Id. at 267.
180. 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) 500 (1839) (per curiam).
181. See Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 263; State v. Walker, 4 N.C. (Car. L. Rep.) 662,
667-69 (1817); Weaver, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) at 55. For an alternative interpretation of these
cases, see MORRIS, supra note 68, at 174-79. The racial ideology of elite white
southerners, some of whom were certain that African Americans' racial makeup kept
them from feeling pain in the same way as whites, reinforced legal practice. See Elizabeth
B. Clark, "The Sacred Rights of the Weak": Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual
Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. AM. HIST. 463,473-75 (1995).
182. Hoover, 20 N.C. (3 & 4 Dev. & Bat.) at 503.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 504-05.
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master whose rights the court compromised."' s That ruling applied to
other masters only in extreme circumstances, when their exercise of
authority took on the character of torture and placed them outside
the role of the master. 189 Otherwise, the state would protect property
rights by staying out of the master-slave relation as it had done in
State v. Mann.
The appellate court then extended these principles to cases
where the parties were not in the same household, explicitly turning a
prerogative of status into a right possessed by all white men. In case
after case, judges gave wide latitude to white men who used force
against slaves. 9 ° These decisions all turned on the rights of the white
male defendants and focused on the provocation offered by the
enslaved victim.191 If those actions were sufficiently damaging, then
the defendant had the right to respond with violence without bearing
criminal responsibility for his acts.'92 The standard was very different
in cases involving free white men, where provocation consisted only
in "actual threats of violence, such as drawing a knife within striking
range." '193 For slaves, appellate courts defined provocation broadly:
insults, disobedience, or threatening gestures proved sufficient to
justify free white men's use of physical force. The court laid out the
conclusion in State v. Tackett194 in 1820:
It exists in the nature of things that, where slavery prevails, the
relation between a white man and a slave differs from that
which subsists between free persons; and . .. the homicide of a
slave may be extenuated by acts which would not produce a
legal provocation if done by a white person. 95
This same standard also applied to assault, as the court explained in
State v. Hale196 in 1823: "[E]very battery on a slave is not indictable,
because the person making it may have matter of excuse or
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See, e.g., State v. Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391 (1849); State v. Hale, 9 N.C. (2
Hawks) 582 (1823); State v. Tackett, 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 210 (1820), overruled by State v.
Watson, 287 N.C. 147, 214 S.E.2d 85 (1975); see also Edwards, Domestic Violence, supra
note 22, at 758-60.
191. See Caesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) at 402-06; Hale, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) at 586; Tackett, 8
N.C. (1 Hawks) at 216.
192. See Edwards, Domestic Violence, supra note 22, at 763-64.
193. Id. at 763.
194. 8 N.C. (1 Hawks) 210 (1820).
195. Id. at 217; see also Edwards, Domestic Violence, supra note 22, at 763-64 ("The
definition of provocation was broader in altercations involving wives and slaves.").
196. 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 582 (1823).
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justification, which would be no defense for committing a battery on a
free person. Each case of this sort must, in a great degree, depend on
its own circumstances. 19 7 Hale affirmed local practice that allowed
assaults against slaves to be tried as criminal offenses to the peace.
Yet here, as elsewhere, the court invoked the peace to limit the
conduct of slaves and to protect the rights of white men who might be
wrongly accused of criminal offenses for battering slaves.
The imposition of this model created a legal world of stark
dichotomies with moral and ethical implications that even its
staunchest supporters found difficult to handle. Chief Justice Ruffin's
1847 discussion of the legal limits of self-defense in State v. Cesar9 8 is
particularly suggestive. The slave, Cesar, used violence to defend his
life from a brutal attack by a white man. The question was whether
his actions were legally justified. Ruffin wrote a long, tortured
decision, trying to work himself out of the legal bind imposed by the
logic of individual rights.199 He began by arguing that violence, in the
form of corporal punishment, was integral to all domestic dependents'
subordination.2"' By extension, he reasoned, the law assumed that
domestic dependents responded to violence differently than did free
white men.20' It also judged their violent acts by different standards.
A child who killed a parent while being punished, for instance, was
guilty of murder because the act could only be seen as "a malignant
and diabolical spirit of vengeance.""2 2 Ruffin then extended this logic
to cover slaves' dealings with all free people. "It is a just conclusion
of reason when a slave kills a white man for a battery ... that the act
did not flow from ... uncontrollable resentment, but from a bad
heart.... "203 Then Ruffin revealed how dangerous domestic
dependents' violent acts were to his understanding of public order. In
his words, slaves with "bad hearts" were "intent upon the assertion of
an equality, social and personal, with the white, and bent on mortal
mischief in support of the assertion."2" Wives, whose domestic status
also followed them beyond the household, could be substituted for
slaves. Their evil intent would be the "assertion of an equality, social
and personal," with men.20 5 If the court sanctioned their use of
197. Id. at 582.
198. 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) 391 (1849).
199. Id. at 412-28 (Ruffin, C.J., dissenting).
200. See id. at 421.
201. See id. at 423.
202. Id. at 422.
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violence, that would grant them equality and the rights that status
implied. Ruffin, however, could not go where the logic led him, even
though he refused to abandon it completely. He sanctioned Cesar's
actions, dissenting from the majority and going against the grain of his
own rulings.0 6 Yet, as he also explained, his decision did not
endanger masters' property rights or extend rights to slaves.20 7 That
was because slaves' acts of self-defense were "natural" responses
exhibited by all animals when their lives were endangered, not the
expression of rights that they would be in legally empowered
individuals.2 °8
CONCLUSION
The impressive documentary record and the compelling
narratives left by Ruffin and his cohort obscure the fact that state law
constituted just one of many options in a complicated legal landscape,
even in the period between 1820 and 1860. To place our emphasis at
that one level, using state law to stand in for North Carolina law, is to
misconstrue the past. We end up anachronistically imposing the logic
of individual rights on public offenses that were actually governed by
a very different vision of the peace. We miss the pervasiveness of
individual rights at the state level, because existing narratives
precondition us to interpret state law as an expression of established
traditions and hide alternatives in localized law that would highlight
the novelty of trends in that body of law.
More importantly, we duplicate state leaders' insidious forms of
elitism, racism, and sexism; we see the law as the domain of the
professionally trained elite and its primary purpose as protecting the
interests of those with rights. That view inaccurately marginalizes all
ordinary North Carolinians-white and black, slave and free, men
and women-who actually played active roles in maintaining the
peace within the state's localized legal system. It also encourages us
to view slaves and all those without the full array of rights in terms of
the theoretical legal subordination posited by state law. That body of
206. See id. at 425-28. "Ruffin was actually dissenting from the majority opinion
written by [Judge] Richmond Pearson, but his point was that the rule Pearson laid out in
this instance was unnecessary because the common law already allowed for the resolution
of such cases." Edwards, Domestic Violence, supra note 22, at 766 n.46; see also State v.
Will, 18 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat.) 121, 121 (1834) (recognizing that the case, although
exceptional in many respects, also conforms to the general rule of self-defense as a
"natural" reaction). The same logic shaped the adjudication of slave violence in South
Carolina. See Edwards, Domestic Violence, supra note 22, at 758-67.
207. Ccesar, 31 N.C. (9 Ired.) at 427-28.
208. Id.
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law, as it emerged in the decades after 1820, focused on rights bearing
individuals, namely free white men who owned property. Those
without rights were marginalized in this body of law, and necessarily
so since they had no way to make claims on the legal system and the
legal system could not recognize their claims without changing their
legal status. Their actions did not translate into legal agency, within
the terms of this system. Nor did their complaints find purchase in
the system, particularly if they involved the rights bearing individuals
who were their heads of household. State law categorized all
domestic dependents' complaints about their patriarchs' exercise of
unlimited, arbitrary power as "private" and "personal" and, thus,
outside its purview. State law also privatized actions, particularly
violent actions, committed by domestic dependents against their
household heads, casting such acts as isolated incidents, the product
of evil and demented minds, not of legitimate complaints or systemic
problems with the South's social structure. Free white men's actions
were legally different. When white men complained about the
women, slaves, and other subordinates in their lives, the state
intervened to uphold their rights and to set precedents involving
other citizens' rights as well. The terms of state law thus direct us to
see slaves and other domestic dependents in particular roles. In fact,
the terms of state law tend to erase these people, as people,
altogether.
The terms of state law also raise questions about individual
rights. Thomas Ruffin's legal world, even its defense of slavery, was
firmly connected to broader, national currents. Like lawmakers
elsewhere in the nation, North Carolina's elite created a legal system
based around rights and extended them broadly among white men, at
least at the state level. Those rights sanctioned white men's power
over their dependents by freeing patriarchal authority from the legal
oversight of the peace. In North Carolina, though, the presence of
slavery shaped the definition and use of rights, resulting in a much
broader conceptions of white men's rights and the state's
responsibility in upholding them. In this regard, North Carolina's
legal history sheds light beyond the region, underscoring the
importance of political context in shaping the meanings given to
rights-and those meanings matter as much as people's access to
rights.
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